




The Dissertation Committee for Neal Kishore Ghosh
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation:
Essays in Applied Economic Theory
Committee:





Essays in Applied Economic Theory
by
Neal Kishore Ghosh, B.A.; M.S. Fin.; M.S. Econ.
DISSERTATION
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
May 2015
To my mother and father, for raising me and helping me develop into the
man I am today, and to Rachel, my beautiful wife, for supporting me at
every turn.
Acknowledgments
First and foremost I would like to acknowledge the Department of Eco-
nomics at the University of Texas at Austin, for funding my studies and sup-
porting my development. This would not have been possible without the
nurturing and challenging learning environment they continue to foster. To
Vivian Goldman-Leﬄer – the graduate program coordinator – for her out-
standing work for graduate students like me, but also for her infectious vivac-
ity, good nature, and humor. A quick stop by her office is all one needs to feel
better about their day. To all my fellow graduate students, thanks so much for
working hard every day, encouraging me to work just as hard, and for being
there to support each other from start to finish.
I wish to thank Thomas Wiseman, my main advisor, for his mentorship,
encouragement, and support. When I came to him in my third year, rudderless
and unfocused, Tom alone helped me figure out a plan to write a job market
paper, organize a dissertation committee, enter the job market, and finish
my thesis. More than offering guidance, he offered me hope, and instilled
in me the confidence and drive to perservere and eventually flourish. His
mentoring style – critical yet supportive, tough yet light-hearted – was the
perfect catalyst for my development and matriculation. Tom is a gem of a
professor, an unquestioned asset to the department, and a friend.
v
I also wish to thank Jason Abrevaya for his professional and academic
mentorship. Jason was invaluable in helping me figure out the best career
path for me, encouraging me to focus on my strengths, and advocating for
me both inside the department and out. Despite his busy schedule, he was
always available for counsel and advice, and took personal ownership in my
success. The future of the department will always be bright while he serves as
its Chair.
Richard Dusansky and Dale Stahl deserve many thanks, both for serv-
ing on my committee, and for offering continued support, guidance, and col-
legiality. In their longstanding tenure, they are pillars of the department and
outstanding scholars and people. Also Stephen Ryan, who fiercely and whole-
heartedly pushed me and other students to attack the job market process with
tenacity and verve.
Michael Blackhurst deserves a special acknowledgement, for collabo-
rating with me on research, for valuing my ideas and work, and for helping
me grow as an economist. Working with him taught me how to represent my
profession while working between disciplines, to work well on a team, and to
see a project through to completion. I will always remain proud of what we
accomplished.
A deep, heartfelt thank you goes to Ivor Clarke and Joel Lucas of
Brightfire, who offered me employment during my PhD studies. Always flexible
with my school schedule, they offered me a platform to apply my tools as
an economist, and as a result, allowed me to help them grow a business.
vi
They supported me, both financially and professionally, the whole way, even
when it took my career elsewhere as a result. They are great leaders, and
more importantly, great people, and I am honored to call them my friends.
I also wish to acknowledge the fine people at TRS, who brought me in for a
Summer to teach econometrics and work on investment problems. It was a
fine experience and helped me grow both academically and professionally.
Lastly, my wonderful friends and family deserve the most thanks of all.
They are the rock on which I stand, without whom none of this is worthwhile.
They believe in me, even if I don’t always believe in myself, and inspire me
to live my life to the fullest. To my dearest Rachel, thank you for loving me
without bound, through rain or shine, and filling my life with happiness each
and every day.
vii
Essays in Applied Economic Theory
Publication No.
Neal Kishore Ghosh, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015
Supervisor: Thomas E. Wiseman
My dissertation studies the application of economic theory in various
settings. Each chapter begins with a basic intuition or question, and then de-
velops the most appropriate methods to investigate. The questions addressed
and results generated are interesting both from a theoretical and practical
standpoint.
The first chapter provides a general model for analyzing affiliate mar-
keting contracts in online advertising, and presents a novel explanation for
the diversity of contracts which exist in the industry. Affiliate marketing is
an online, pay-per-performance advertising industry, where advertisers must
specify the user action (impression of the ad, user click, final sale, etc.) on
which to remunerate publishers (the “affiliates”) who advertise on their be-
half. In practice, many different actions are utilized. The main result here
is that if users are heterogenous, and publishers know more about their users
viii
than advertisers, then the specified action serves as a selection mechanism
that incentivizes the publisher to advertise only to a desirable set of users.
Also, choosing the appropriate action minimizes expenses to the advertiser.
When there are many different user types, each with varying worth to both
the advertiser and publisher, achieving both of these goals requires a rich set
of contractible actions. More generally, the approach used here can be im-
plemented in other environments where asymmetric information and adverse
selection play a role.
The second chapter studies the rebound effect, or the increased use of
energy services following an increase in the efficiency of that service. This
effect is widely studied in the literature, but it usually only considered in a
single-service environment. Such a framework ignores the potentially signifi-
cant indirect rebound effects which occur through increased purchasing power
for other services, and does not allow for joint efficiency improvements across
many services, what we call “efficiency correlation.” We develop a house-
hold production model with two energy services and distinct but simultaneous
efficiency changes to test the implications of efficiency correlation on net en-
ergy elasticities and the rebound effect. Positively correlated efficiency choices
across end-uses increase technically feasible energy reductions but also drive
additional rebound responses that erode these savings. Moreover, we find
that negative correlation can significantly reverse any energy savings (e.g. a
household installs energy-saving window panes but then trades in their sedan
for a SUV), but that current Federal efficiency standards make this scenario
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unlikely. This paper offers new insight into a host of additional behavioral
responses to efficiency improvements, particularly the incidence of efficiency
correlation across different energy services, and highlights its implication for
realized energy savings.
The third chapter studies the effect of negative equity and landlock on
household mobility and employment. This paper incorporates a novel friction
– that households which are both underwater and insolvent cannot sell their
home – into a search model where agents face a restriction of job opportunities
based on their net asset positions. Ultimately, agents in deep-enough negative
equity and insolvency quit searching altogether, reducing labor supply and
mobility. Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances present empirical ev-
idence which is consistent with this result. The welfare gains from removing
this friction suggest that a median income earner is willing to pay about 2%
of her income, or between 3-4 percentage points in additional interest on her
debt to remove this constraint. This suggests that the landlock effect repre-
sents an incomplete lending market. If feasible, homeowners would be willing
to compensate lenders to swap-out mortgage debt with other loans which do
not constrain mobility. Removing the landlock restriction also results in higher
search effort and lower durations, as households are better off being able to
search and obtain better employment opportunities when they are underwater,
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A Generalized Model of Affiliate Marketing
Contracts
1.1 Introduction
Affiliate marketing is a largely online industry where advertisers market
their goods and services through third-party entities, or “affiliates.” Typically,
affiliates are website publishers who, on behalf of the advertiser, promote var-
ious advertisements (banner, display, pop-ups) to the users who traffic their
site. Affiliate marketing has expanded rapidly over the last two decades, both
due to the growth of e-commerce, as well as increasing capabilities for the
automated implementation, monitoring, processing, and reporting of adver-
tising contracts. Recent estimates suggest this industry generated $5 billion
in revenue annually in the U.S., and some $20 billion globally, with indus-
try forecasts projecting double-digit growth over the next five years Forrester
[2012], IAB [2013]. However, despite its growth and expanding presence in the
online marketplace, affiliate marketing has received little attention from the
economic research community.
Affiliate marketing contracts between advertisers and publishers are
unique in that they are two-dimensional, depending on both a price and a
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user action. Examples of user actions include impressions (page views), clicks,
registrations, and sales, but extend to any user behavior which can be observed
and recorded (see Figure 1 for an illustration).1 As publishers and advertisers
alike improve their abilities to record and account for user behavior, this set
of identifiable actions continues to grow. In practice, advertisers utilize many
different actions, resulting in a large set of vastly different contracts throughout
the industry. Why do so many contract forms exist? This is a somewhat
odd feature, for one might think that a simple fixed-price contract or revenue-
sharing agreement would be more natural and ubiquitous. This paper presents
a novel framework to explain this stylized fact.
The main intuition is that when publishers have private information
about their user types, then the choice of user action will influence the set of
users to which the publisher will advertise; thus, the action acts as a selection
mechanism. A simple example would be a sport’s website, visited by male and
female users, that is advertising fantasy football, a product which is heavily
consumed by men. An advertiser would be inclined to offer a contract which
incentivized the publisher to only advertise to the male types. This could be
achieved by basing the contracts on user clicks (if men are more likely to click
the ad than women) or directly on sales. On the other hand, a contract based
on impressions would not be ideal, since both men and women observe the ad
with the same frequency. Each action, and the probability that each type will
1Industry conventions include the PPC (pay-per-click) contract, where advertisers pay
each time a click is generated, or a CPA (cost-per-action) contract, where the advertiser
chooses some specified action on which to remunerate the publisher.
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take it, will have a different selection effect on the publisher’s user population.
An optimal action will perfectly filter the desired users from the rest.
However, user heterogeneity alone does not explain why so many con-
tracts exist in the industry. For example, an advertiser seeking to target
revenue-generating user types can simply offer a pay-per-sale (PPS) contract,
which would directly link advertising expenses with revenue. Indeed, the Ama-
zon Associates Program. a well-known affiliate program run by Amazon.com,
compensates publishers in this manner. However, a PPS contract is not always
optimal. The reason is that the publisher has different opportunity costs for
each user type, and a PPS contract, while effective in targeting the right users,
may result in advertising costs that are too high. To reuse the example above,
suppose men are classified into two types – young and old – who, conditional
on viewing the ad, are 30% and 20% likely to play fantasy football, respec-
tively. Now suppose the opportunity cost to the publisher of showing the ad
to young and old men is $3/view and $1/view, respectively. If the advertiser
wants to market to both types with a PPS contract, they will need to offer at
least $10/sale (because the publisher’s expected payout ($10× 0.3) equals the
opportunity costs of young men ($3) at that price). However, at $10/sale, the
advertiser is paying (in expectation) $2/view for old men, which is higher than
the publisher’s opportunity cost of $1/view. If the advertiser wants to pay the
opportunity cost for old men, they will offer $5/sale, but, that price will not
be enough to induce the publisher to market to young men. Thus, to market
to both types, the advertiser must overpay for one of them. In this scenario,
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an action will be optimal only if it is completed by young men three times as
frequently as old men, because that is the only way the advertiser can equate
the expected payout of each type with their respective opportunity cost.
Without a rich set of contractible actions, the advertiser’s problem is
very similar to a monopolist’s problem. Recall that a monopolist, facing a
downward-sloping demand curve, can only increase sales by lowering the price
(and profit) for all preceding consumers. This trade-off exists because the
monopolist only has one lever (price) to adjust. Similarly, if the advertiser
is forced to use only PPS contracts, they also have just one lever (price) to
maneuver. This result is inefficient, as it forces the advertiser to either forego
marketing to desirable user types, or pay too much for the types to whom they
already market. However, with many actions to consider, the advertiser can
choose the one which both selects the right users and pays the opportunity
cost to acquire them. Put another way, because the user action is an extra
dimension to the contract, the advertiser can price-discriminate in a manner
that is not achievable when only the contract price can be adjusted. Because
each publisher varies in their user types and corresponding opportunity costs,
each contract will necessitate a different optimal action. The more actions
from which an advertiser can choose, the more profitable they will be.
This paper provides two main contributions. First, this paper presents
a novel explanation for the diversity and complexity of contracts which exist in
the industry, and particularly, explains why a more natural contract form like
revenue-sharing does not dominate. Secondly, this paper provides a general
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model for analyzing affiliate marketing contracts. With a richer action-space,
the model is more robust than other treatments which focus on a small set
of pre-specified alternatives. Also, previous treatments of affiliate marketing
contracts have offered limited attention to user heterogeneity,2 so the model
provides a clearer representation of how different users are valued both by the
publisher and advertiser. Finally, the model can be applied to other environ-
ments where private information and adverse selection play a role, such as
health insurance markets, job training programs, and wage contracts.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion on
the background and existing literature on affiliate marketing and action-based
contracts. Section 3 presents the model primitives, the baseline model, and re-
sults. Section 4 presents an extended model with multiple advertisers. Section
5 details further extensions and robustness results. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Background, Existing Literature, and Motivation
As previously mentioned, one of the earliest affiliate programs was de-
veloped by Amazon.com in 1996, known as the the Amazon Associates Pro-
gram [Libai et al., 2003]. A publisher could enroll as an Associate, display
product advertisements on behalf of Amazon, and receive a commission (typi-
cally, a percentage of the revenue) for any purchases that were generated from
2One exception is [Hu et al., 2010], where user heterogeneity is indirectly implied through
a “publisher’s effort function,” and the publisher can be incentivized through performance-
based payouts to match the ad with the right users who will most benefit the advertiser.
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the Associate. For Amazon, offering commissions induces publishers to ad-
vertise, tapping into previously unreached markets and driving up sales. For
the publisher, the program offers an auxiliary source of revenue, particularly
in instances when the publisher has unused site-space to fill, or when the user
population closely aligns with the promoted products. The affiliate program
has continued to this day, making Amazon one of the largest advertisers in the
US. While Amazon is a single advertiser working with many publishers, the
converse arrangement, where one publisher contracts with many advertisers,
is also quite common, particularly through major search-engines like Google
and Yahoo!. Google Adwords offers a platform through which advertisers can
bid to display their ads in designated slots above and on the side of the search
results which are displayed after a user’s query. Google harnesses generalized
second-price auctions to assign advertisers to slots, and charges those adver-
tisers on a pay-per-click (PPC) basis. Google, Yahoo!, and now Facebook, all
depend on advertising revenue as a core component of their business models.
The ubiquity of major search-engines like Google, along with the complexities
of the auction itself, make it an interesting topic for research spanning eco-
nomics, marketing, computer science, and operations [Edelman et al., 2007,
Feldman et al., 2007, Xu et al., 2011].
The above examples are special cases of affiliate marketing, but do not
represent the entire industry. First, most publishers do not have the market
power to construct their own auctions or contract mechanisms to which adver-
tisers must abide; instead, the advertiser is charged with presenting a contract
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to the publisher. Moreover, while the unit price of a Google click or an Ama-
zon purchase is variable to the parameters of the auction or the purchase,
most affiliate marketing contracts specify a fixed-price per user action. Lastly,
before a final purchase, the user typically has to undertake a series of steps, or
actions. For example, a user might have to observe the ad, click the ad, peruse
the advertiser’s website, complete a registration form, submit a credit card,
and then complete the purchase. This corresponds to the “funnel” analogy of
marketing, where the path from a lead to a sale includes a series of actions,
and a lead must complete each action in order to matriculate to a sale. Affil-
iate marketing contracts are constructed based on one of these intermediary
actions, which will occur at various stages of the “funnel.” As an example,
an advertiser can offer publishers a fixed dollar amount per impression, click
(PPC, or pay-per-click), e-mail subscription, or product sale (PPS, or pay-
per-sale). Therefore, the advertiser has freedom over two dimensions of the
contract: the user action, and the unit price of that action. A publisher, on
the other hand, must decide between alternative contracts which are not only
varying in price, but in the specified action as well. As an example, a publisher
might have to choose between receiving $1 per-click, where the click-through
probability is 80%, or receiving $2 per-registration, where the probability is
40%. This extra dimension makes affiliate marketing contracts unique and
somewhat more complicated than contracts where the unit of transfer is uni-
form. While some research has studied the trade-offs between two or three
alternative actions [Hu et al., 2010, Goel and Munagala, 2009, Agarwal et al.,
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2009], the literature appears to be lacking a comprehensive model to evaluate
the entire space of actions which can be (and are) utilized in affiliate marketing
contracts.
As detailed previously, the sponsored-search auction is a specialized
and wildly popular affiliate marketing arrangement between one large pub-
lisher (the search engine) and many advertisers. Extensive research has been
conducted on the design, efficiency, implementation, and strategy of sponsored-
search auctions [Varian, 2007, Edelman et al., 2007, Chen et al., 2009, Feldman
et al., 2007]. The earliest analyses of affiliate marketing as an industry were
more descriptive in nature and touted the risk-sharing benefits of action-based
contracts [Hoffman and Novak, 2000, Duffy, 2005]. These works exhibit similar
themes as presented by Allen and Lueck [1992] from the agricultural literature,
where land is analogous to page-space, and the publisher must choose between
fixed-price or pay-per-performance farming agreements. More recently, re-
searchers have begun to further analyze advertisers’ strategy when multiple
contract options are available. Examples include Edelman and Lee [2008],
Goel and Munagala [2009], Zhu and Wilbur [2011], who analyze theoretical
“hybrid” auctions which include CPM (cost per impression), CPC (cost per
click), and CPA contracts. They find that advertisers select into different con-
tracts based on their private information about conversion rates. Similarly,
Agarwal et al. [2009] analyze the implementation of CPA contracts into the
standard sponsored-search auction and also note that advertisers’ private in-
formation can skew the auctioneer’s estimate of per-view expected revenue.
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These treatments all point out the implications of unobserved advertiser qual-
ity and their corresponding effects on auction performance. While important
for sponsored-search, these issues are less of a concern for more general affili-
ate contracts, which occur over long periods (both in time and observational
frequency) where click-through and other conversion rates can be estimated
reliably. Other treatments like Hu et al. [2010] consider the incentive impli-
cations of CPC versus CPA contracts in the more general setting between
publisher and advertiser. They argue that CPA contracts can induce better
“efforts” from both parties to improve the effectiveness of campaigns. These
efforts may include better design, layout, and copy of the advertisements, and
importantly, better matching between users and advertisers by the publisher.
The latter notion suggests that publishers’ private information about user
types can alter the effectiveness of advertising campaigns, a result which is
echoed in this model’s most interesting results. While Hu et al. [2010] flash
upon many similar arguments as this work, user heterogeneity is not formally
incorporated in their model. Lastly, there is an emerging literature in this
space on the presence and consequence of click and other types of fraud [Edel-
man and Brandi, 2014, Nazerzadeh et al., 2008, Wilbur and Zhu, 2009]. These
analyses note how fraud can occur on the publisher side (by deriving artificial
clicks or actions, triggering the advertiser to pay for false leads) or the adver-
tiser side (withholding completed actions to lower payments to the publisher).
These issues are important in the context of the stability and credibility of
affiliate marketing agreements, and many technical advancements have been
9
put into place to mitigate fraud.3
While previous treatments have focused on the implications of various
issues like click fraud, measurement error, or private information about conver-
sion rates, they do not account for the large set of contractible actions which
can be utilized, nor do they account for user heterogeneity. Importantly, they
do not tackle the broader question of why so many actions exist to begin with.
The explanation offered in this paper is that when users are heterogenous,
and publishers know more about their users than advertisers, then the speci-
fied action serves as a selection mechanism that incentivizes the publisher to
advertise only to a desirable set of users. To illustrate, three simple examples
are presented:
EXAMPLE A: A publisher runs a sport’s website, which features
two main pages: one for men’s sports, and one for women’s sports.
The advertiser promotes fantasy football packages. Empirically,
men are far more likely than women to purchase the fantasy foot-
ball package. Moreover, it is observed that the men heavily visit
the men’s page, while women heavily visit the women’s page. The
publisher can observe users based on which page they visit, while
the advertiser cannot. If an impression-based contract is offered,
the publisher is likely to show the ad over both pages, resulting in
3For example, most advertisers can identify the IP address that is associated with each
user, which does not change. Therefore, if the advertiser observes multiple clicks or ac-
tions with the same IP address, then the advertiser can deduce that this is the same user.
Therefore, by “distincting” on IP address, the advertiser correctly identifies the quantity of
distinct users, and negates any attempt by the publisher to act in bad-faith on the contract.
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the advertiser paying for advertisement space on the women’s page
that is not necessarily desired. However, a click-based contract,
assuming men are more likely to click the ad than women, will
incentivize the publisher only to show the ad on the men’s page.
EXAMPLE B: A publisher runs a job-searching site, and can
distinguish users based on their employment status: unemployed
or employed. The advertiser promotes resume-building services.
Empirically, the unemployed population, due to their relatively
low opportunity cost of time, is far more likely to click on the ad
than the employed population. However, the unemployed popu-
lation, due to their relatively lower income, are far less likely to
ultimately purchase. A PPC contract will generate a substantial
number of clicks from the unemployed population which will ulti-
mately result in few sales. Instead, an action-based contract, such
as a credit card form submission, may better target the employ-
ment population which will ultimately purchase.
EXAMPLE C: A publisher runs a clothing website, visited by
two types of shoppers: repeat purchasers and window shoppers.
The advertiser is running a campaign for a separate clothing line,
and offers promotions through an e-mail list. Window shoppers are
just as likely as repeat purchasers to subscribe to the e-mail list,
yet, window shoppers will never make purchases. In this case, even
a highly-involved action like an e-mail subscription will generate
marketing expenses for window shoppers which do not result in
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sales. In this scenario, the advertiser is better off with a PPS
contract, to ensure that advertising expenses precisely target the
sales-generating users.
In all three examples, the advertiser must choose a contract without being
privy to user heterogeneity that is only known to the publisher. Based on
the likelihood that each type will undertake each action, the advertiser must
choose the action which appropriately targets the desired population. Failure
to do so results in the advertiser needlessly incurring expenses to the publisher
for user types that do not generate sales. In the context of user heterogeneity,
advertisers must choose the correct actions on which to base a contract to
screen out the desired users from the rest.
1.3 Model
This section will detail the formal model, which characterizes the user
population based on sale and action probabilities, and specifies the objectives
and behavior of both the publisher and advertiser. First presented are the
model primitives (3.1), then the publisher’s and advertiser’s problems and
solutions in the baseline case (3.2 and 3.3), and conclusions and implications




The model assumes the existence of one publisher who offers one and
only one advertising slot to potential advertisers. The publisher’s website is
frequented by a population of users each period, which is normalized to have
measure one without loss of generality. The publisher observes the user-type
once the user visits the website.
Definition 1.3.1. The user-population is characterized by t ∈ T = [0, 1],
with the distribution of types denoted F (t) and assumed to be continuous and
uniform, F (t) = t.
In the baseline model, only one advertiser can offer a contract, while in
a later extension multiple advertisers will be considered. For a given advertiser,
the random variable S denotes the outcome of interest, which typically is the
final sale of the product being promoted. A sale either occurs or does not,
thus range (S) = {0, 1}, where S = 1 implies a sale.
Assumption 1. For each type, the conditional distribution of final sales P (S = 1|t)
is assumed to be Bernoulli with success parameter p : T → [0, 1]. Without loss
of generality, types can be ordered such that p(t) is decreasing in t.
Definition 1.3.2. A contractible action will be denoted as a. Let the random
variable A denote the action’s outcome, where A = 1 indicates the action is
taken and A = 0 indicates it was not. P (A = 1|t) = pa(t).
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This probability is also known as a conversion rate. Consistent with
the marketing “funnel,” any action must occur at or before a sale, and, no sale
can be generated without the action being completed first:
Assumption 2. For any a, and any t,
i) pa(t) ≥ p(t), and
ii) P (S (t) = 1|A (t) = 0) = 0.
Figure 2a demonstrates this user path through a sequence of different
actions. What is important to note is that the post-action probability of sale
p(t)/pa(t) is larger if the action occurs “deeper” in the funnel, meaning that the
advertiser can achieve a better post-action success rate if leads are acquired
closer to the point of sale, and vice versa. This notion is better illustrated
through the joint action-sale probability distribution:
A(t), S(t) 1 0
1 p(t) pa(t)− p(t)
0 0 1− pa(t)
An impression is a special case where pa (t) = 1; that is, the action (a
page view) is always taken. This action represents the beginning of the funnel,
since no user actions can be observed before the user arrives at the publisher’s
website. Because impressions happen automatically, there is no information
obtained through it, and so the posterior probability of sale is the same as the
prior, P (S(t) = 1|A(t) = 1) = P (S(t) = 1) = p(t). On the other end of the
spectrum is the final sale, which is a special (and redundant) action, where
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pa(t) = p(t), and so P (S(t) = 1|A(t) = 1) = 1. Consistent with the funnel,
any other action must exhibit a conversion rate between these two extremes.
Assumption 3. For any action a, for any t, pa(t) ∈ [p(t), 1].
In the “funnel” model, actions are ordered based on their conversion
rate. This provides a convenient classification of actions, equally based on the
frequency of their occurrence, how “deep” the user is into the funnel, and the
corresponding post-action sale-probability p (t) /pa (t). Moreover, actions are
characterized not just on their conversion rate for a given t, but also how the
conversion rate varies across t.
Definition 1.3.3. The mapping between types and conversion rates is referred
to as the action-profile, pa : T → [0, 1].
Next, we define the set of conceivable action-profiles. Any action-profile
is conceivable so long as Assumption 3 holds.
Definition 1.3.4. The set of all conceivable action-profiles is P = {pa(t) :
∀t, p(t) ≤ pa(t) ≤ 1}.
Figure 2b shows the relationship between t, p (t), and P, along with
generic action-profiles. Next, we define the action space. The space of all
possible actions is denoted A. A key motivation of the model is that many
action choices are possible. The model will assume that A is so large that any
action profile in P is achievable.
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Assumption 4. For any h (t) ∈ P, ∃a ∈ A such that pa (t) = h (t).
The richness ofA is one major innovation of this model, as it generalizes
the action-space from which advertisers can choose in formulating contracts.
A is infinite, and large enough that uncountably infinite action-profiles can be
achieved, with no restrictions on their shape other than Assumption 3. For
example, action profiles need not be monotone, continuous, or differentiable.
Assumption 4 simply states that there exists a large enough set of actions such
that any action-profile pa (t) can be achieved, so long as p (t) ≤ pa (t) ≤ 1 for
all t.
Lastly, the contract space is the Cartesian product R+ × A, and a
contract is a single point in this space, consisting of one action and one price.
In words, the contract determines that the publisher is paid the contract price
each time a user completes the specified action. The action-profile determines
how often that action will occur for each type.
Definition 1.3.5. A contract, denoted C = (c, a) ∈ R+ ×A, establishes that
the advertiser must pay a cost, c, for each user-type t whenever A (t) = 1.
It is assumed that the sale-probabilities and action-profile are known
by both parties when the contract is offered; thus, the baseline model does
not formally incorporate “learning” by either side. Moreover, the contract
is binding for the entire period, and each side is assumed to comply with
the terms of the contract, thereby eliminating any motivations for fraud. In
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Section 5, the model will be extended to relax these assumptions. To conclude,
the model’s two main innovations are:
1. the existence of user heterogeneity as characterized by types t ∈ [0, 1]
with varying sale-probabilities p(t), and
2. the generalized action space A, from which advertisers can choose when
devising affiliate marketing contracts.
The baseline model to follow represents a sequential one-shot game between
advertiser and publisher. Contracts are offered from the advertiser to the
publisher in advance of a fixed period of time. The publisher then decides to
which user-types to show the advertisement. The analysis begins with solving
for the publisher’s best-response to a specified contract offered.
1.3.2 Publisher’s Problem
The publisher is a risk-neutral profit maximizer. For each user-type,
the publisher must decide whether to display the advertiser’s advertisement,
or some other alternative. For each type, the payout from the alternative has
a known, expected value of r(t). Qualitatively, r (t) might represent an offer
from a competing advertiser, or perhaps the opportunity cost of distracting
the user away from the publisher’s content.
Definition 1.3.6. The publisher must consider the choice function: v(t) :
T → {0, 1}, where v(t) = 1 if the publisher chooses the advertiser’s ad for
type t, and v(t) = 0 if the publisher chooses the alternative.
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The publisher’s expected profit, as a function of the choice function
v(t) and contract C = (c, a), is:
E [ΠP (C, v)] =
∫
t
(v(t) · c · pa (t) + (1− v(t)) r (t)) dt (1.1)
Define the set of all mappings from T → {0, 1} as V . For an offered
contract, the publisher’s problem is:
max
v∈V
E [ΠP (C, v)] (1.2)
Solution
For any type t given to the advertiser, the per-view revenue, or expected payout
for the publisher is c×pa (t). The following definition establishes ma (t), which
will be a key object throughout the rest of the paper, and will be referenced
in succeeding propositions and solutions.
Definition 1.3.7. Define ma (t) = r(t)
pa(t)
. This is the contract price which, for
a given action a, pays out r (t) in expectation for type t.
It is straightforward to verify that ma (t) × pa (t) = r (t). This is the
price paid to the publisher (for a given t) such that the expected payout from
the advertiser matches the expected payout from the alternative. Any price
lower than ma (t) makes the advertiser’s contract strictly worse, while any
price higher than ma (t) makes the advertiser’s contract strictly better.
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From the definition above, it is straightforward to show that the pub-




1 if c ≥ ma (t)
0 if c < ma (t)
The firm’s expected profit function is:
E [ΠP (C)] =
∫
t
max {pa(t) · c, r (t)} dt (1.3)
1.3.2.1 Targeting Properties of Action Profiles
At this stage, it is useful to demonstrate how the publisher’s optimal
response varies with the contract price that accompanies a given action. This
analysis will also serve to show the particular effectiveness of the action-profile
(pa(t)) in its ability to induce the publisher to show the ad only to a targeted
group of types. With a given action and corresponding action-profile, ma (t)
is fixed across t, and so the price level c will determine precisely which users
are shown the ad, and which users are shown the alternative.
Definition 1.3.8. For a given action a and contract price c, there exists a
target group of user-types, T : R+ × A → T , such that for t ∈ T (c, a),
v∗ (t) = 1, and for t /∈ T (c, a), v∗ (t) = 0.
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Definition 1.3.9. From the publisher’s solution, T (c, a) = {t : c ≥ ma (t)}.
Proposition 1.3.1. For a fixed a, If ma (t) is weakly increasing over all t ∈ T ,
then there exists a cut-off type t(c) such that T (c, a) = [0, t(c)].
Proof. If ma (t) is weakly increasing, then if ∃ {t1, t2} ∈ T such that c =
ma (t1) = m
a (t2), then ∀t ∈ [t1, t2], c = ma (t). Call tH = max {t : c = ma (t)}.
v∗ (t) = 1 if t ≤ tH and v∗ (t) = 0 if t > tH . If tH = ∅, then either v∗ (t) = 1 or
v∗ (t) = 0 ∀t. In all cases, v∗ (t) is monotonically decreasing in t. Therefore,
∃t :T (c, a) = [0, t].
T (c, a) foremostly defines the concept of a “target” user-population,
as in the set of users that the advertiser will ultimately reach. For a fixed
action-profile, the advertiser can only vary the price to induce the publisher
to show the advertisement to the desired type. Specifically, the advertiser
must set c = ma (t) in order to (at least) target type t. T (c, a) is weakly
increasing in c, which simply means that the advertiser reaches weakly more
users by increasing the contract price. Proposition 1 states a special case where
if ma (t) is increasing, then the target group is always a continuous interval
between t = 0 and some cut-off type t(c). This simply means that T (c, a)
always increases in t as well. This special case is a convenient framing of the
advertiser’s potential traffic pool, since the user-types are ordinally ranked
based on their sale-probabilities. Therefore, the advertiser can seek to target
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the “best” user-types (as ranked by p(t)) and incrementally obtain lesser and
lesser types as seen fit.
Figure 3a-e illustrates this feature with various specifications of pa(t)
assuming a constant r (t) = r, along with corresponding graphs of T (c, a).
Notice how in some illustrations, T (c, a) is flat over some intervals. This
indicates that there are discontinuous jumps in pa(t) such that incremental
movements in c do not generate any new traffic. Also, notice how over intervals
where ma (t) is constant (in Figure 3a-e, since r(t) = r, this occurs when pa(t)
is constant), T (c, a) exhibits discontinuous jumps. This is because, to the
publisher, all types with the same pa(t) are identical from a revenue standpoint,
so they will always either be shown or not shown the ad in unison. Put another
way, if pa(t) = pa(t′) then v(t) = v(t′). Therefore, (t, t′) cannot be separated
with this particular action-profile.
Proposition 1.3.2. For a given a and pa(t), define:
T (κ) = {t ∈ T : ma (t) = κ ∈ R++}.
∀c, either T (c, a) ∩ T (κ) = T (κ) or T (c, a) ∩ T (κ) = ∅.
Proof. For all t, t′ ∈ T (κ), ma (t) = ma (t′), therefore, v(t) = v(t′). Therefore,
the targeted population will either include both types or none.
This speaks to the power of the action-profile as an instrument to tar-
get population types. For the advertiser, if a subset of types all have the same
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conversion rate (relative to the publisher’s reservation pay-out), then subsets
within this subset cannot be separately targeted with that action profile. If
the action-profile specifies them as identical to the publisher, they cannot be
cleanly separated and must be either bought all together or foregone com-
pletely. This presents a problem to the advertiser, who may be interested in
filtering in and filtering out user types in precise detail.
Corollary 1.3.3. If ma (t) is increasing over all t ∈ T , and if ∃[t, t] ⊆ T
such that ∀t, t′ ∈ [t, t],ma (t) = ma (t′), then any t ∈ [t, t) cannot be a cut-off
type t(c) for any c. In the case where r(t) = r and for the impression action,
characterized pa(t) = 1, no t ∈ (0, 1) can be a cut-off type t(c) for any c.
In the special case where ma (t) is weakly increasing, if the advertiser
wishes to cleanly separate the user-types based on their value (high-revenue t’s
are shown the ad, while low-revenue t’s are not), this corollary demonstrates
that it would be impossible to do so if the action-profile specifies them as iden-
tical to the publisher. Moreover, in the particular case where the publisher’s
alternative pay-out is constant across types (r(t) = r) and the particular ac-
tion being considered is the impression (where pa(t) = 1), the advertiser has
no choice but to either target the whole population or none of it; there is no
ability to separate out any subsets of the user-types.
Observe Figure 4 to demonstrate, following Example A from Section
2. In this example, men (80%) are much more likely to generate a sale than
women (10%). However, using an impression-based contract the advertiser can
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either target both men and women (by setting c ≥ r) or neither (by setting
c < r). This may not be optimal, particularly if it is not profitable to pay
the publisher to promote the ad to women. However, using the click-action,
because men (90%) are more likely to click than women (60%), the advertiser
can target men exclusively by setting r/0.9 ≤ c < r/0.6.
Even though the advertiser has to pay more per-click than per-impression
(since r (t) /pa (t) is higher than r (t)), the advertiser is still better off because
i) they have to pay for less clicks to generate the same number of sales, and ii)
importantly, they do not buy as many leads which ultimately will not produce
a sale. It is the ability to separate good types from bad that becomes the
primary concern for advertiser. The results above suggest that in many cases,
clean separation cannot occur if the action-profile does not conform to a shape
which makes separation possible. The contract price c can increase or decrease
traffic, but is limited in its ability to target particular user-types, which de-
pending on how p(t) varies, can be of a paramount importance. The contract
price is a blunt instrument in that regard, suggesting the advertiser can bet-
ter target desired user-types by manipulating the action-profile instead. The
following section will detail how the advertiser optimally chooses the contract
offered.
1.3.3 Advertiser’s Problem
The advertiser is also a risk-neutral profit-maximizer, and stands to
make pi in profit from each sale. For a given contract, the advertiser generates
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sales from whatever users are sent over from the advertiser, while only having
to pay the contract price for the users who complete the contract’s specified
action. However, the advertiser cannot distinguish the user types as they come
in, and so does not have complete control over which user types are completing
the action and thus generating expenses. As previewed by the previous section,
the advertiser has a three-stage problem in constructing a contract:
1. To determine which user-types to target,
2. To choose an action that effectively separates those desired users from
the undesired, and then,
3. To set a contract price that minimizes the total expenditure to acquire
those users.
For a given contract, and the publisher’s optimal response, the advertiser’s
expected profit function is:
E [ΠAd (C)] =
∫
t
[1 (t ∈ T (c, a)) (pip(t)− c · pa(t))] dt (1.4)
The advertiser’s problem is to choose a contract in order to maximize
expected profit:





The solution will begin by solving the three-fold problem in reverse.
Proposition 1.3.4. Given an action a with pa (t), suppose the advertiser must
acquire at least type t. Then, the optimal contract price is c∗ = ma (t).
Proof. Any c ≥ ma (t) successfully targets the user type. Assume c∗ > ma (t).
The advertiser can lower c∗ a small ε such that c − ε > ma (t). The type is
still targeted, but now costs are lower and therefore profit is higher. Thus, c∗
cannot be optimal.
Section 3.2 discussed that the publisher only shows the ad to a par-
ticular type t if c ≥ ma (t). Therefore, the advertiser, for each targeted
type t, will only pay the minimum per-type cost of r (t) by setting c so that
c× pa (t) = r (t).
Proposition 1.3.5. Given a set of targeted user types T , all contracts:
C (T ) = {(c, a) : (∀t ∈ T , c ≥ ma (t)) ∧ (∀t /∈ T , c < ma (t))}
will result in v∗ (t) = 1 (t ∈ T ).
Proof. Follows directly from the Publisher’s solution.
Leveraged with the action-spaceA, the advertiser can find the necessary
pa (t) to adjust which types see the ad and which do not. This is because for a
given c, the advertiser can adjust pa(t) such that all the targeted types exhibit
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c ≥ ma (t), and all other types exhibit c < ma (t), thereby ensuring that the
publisher only promotes the ad to the types that the advertiser wishes to
target. Putting together Propositions 3 and 4, the solution is achieved:
• T ∗ = {t : pip(t)− r (t) ≥ 0}.
• C∗ (T ∗) = {(c, a) : (∀t ∈ T ∗, c = ma (t)) ∧ (∀t /∈ T ∗, c < ma (t))}.
• E [ΠAd] =
∫
t
[1 (t ∈ T ∗) (pip(t)− r(t))] dt.
The optimal contract design also allows the advertiser to perfectly separate
the traffic population so that only the desired user-types are acquired, while
minimizing the expenses paid to reach those types (r(t)). Since the per-view
cost of r (t) can always be achieved, the advertiser chooses to target all users
such that pip(t) ≥ r (t).
1.3.4 Analysis
The solution to the advertiser’s problem presents three interesting con-
clusions. First, the contract’s action profile is a much more precise instrument
in determining which user-types are targeted and which are not. As shown in
Figure 3, moving the contract price c can result in large jumps in traffic or
nothing at all; however, finely tuning the action-profile can precisely exclude
the undesired user-types from the desired types. This speaks to the emphasis
on “creative” testing and other layout/design experimenting, which allows the
advertiser to hone their ability to make these incremental adjustments.
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Second, aside from distinguishing the targeted types from the rest, the
action-profile can be chosen so that the advertiser only has to pay r (t) (and
no more) on a per-view basis for the user-traffic that is acquired. This is
achieved by selecting pa (t) such that ma (t) is constant across all the targeted
user-types. By doing so, the advertiser can offer the contract price c = ma (t),
resulting in paying the per-view price of r (t) for all targeted types. This is an
optimal result since r (t) is the minimum expected payout that still induces
the publisher to promote the advertisement to that type. Since pip (t) ≥ r (t)
for all types in the targeted set, per-type (expected) profits are always weakly
positive. Figure 5 demonstrates the profit scenarios for Example A. In the
examples, r (t) = r = $6 and pi = $24. At these levels, only men are optimally
targeted because $24 · 0.9 > $6 and $24 · 0.1 < $6. Using the impression
action, the advertiser cannot exclusively target men, and so maximum profits
are lower than what can be achieved using the click-action. Note that for
both actions, the maximum profit point occurs when c = ma (t); any higher c
results in lower profits, either because i) the advertiser is obtaining user-types
that are not profitable, or ii) the advertiser is unnecessarily paying too much
in per-view costs.
Finally, the results above suggests a largely unintuitive result, that
contracts based on more informative actions (e.g. actions with an action-profile
that is small in magnitude, like in PPS contracts) are not always optimal.
This is because if the action profile pa(t) is low (ma (t) is high) for some t,
the advertiser must set a higher contract price c to target that type. That
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higher price, however, has to be paid across all completed actions, including
those types who have a higher pa(t) (lower ma (t)), thereby increasing the costs
associated with these types. Therefore, it is optimal for the advertiser to choose
an action such that ma (t) is constant across all targeted types, regardless
of how informative the action may be. Take Figure 6a, which presents the
same illustration as Figure 5 except that p (Women) = 0.3. In this scenario,
targeting both men and women is profitable. Using the impression action, the
advertiser can achieve maximum profits by setting the contract price c = $6.
However, using the click-action, the advertiser must set c = mc (W ) = $10
to target both men and women. In doing so, the advertiser now must pays
$10 · 0.9 = $9 in per-view costs for men, higher than the $6 reservation price.
Thus, total profits are lower using the click action than the impression action,
even though clicks are more informative. This occurs because, in this special
case, the click action-profile (which varies across t) results in a varying ma (t)
across the targeted set of user types, while the impression action profile does
not.
Lastly, Figure 6b demonstrates that even PPS contracts will not be
optimal generally. Figure 6b takes the same illustration as Figure 6a, but
now assumes r (Women) = $5, while r (Men) = $6. It is still the case that
T ∗ = {Men,Women}, but for impressions, clicks, and even sales, ma (Men) 6=
ma (Women). Thus, none of these actions can be optimal. Instead, another





The model results corroborate several stylized facts about the industry.
28
First, they help to explain why CPM contracts are so rare, and why the affil-
iate marketing industry was quick to move away from them. Many publishers
are not sourced with alternative options for every user-type which visits their
site, and so it is likely that they have a uniform alternative (r (t) = r) at hand
when considering an advertiser’s contract. In this case, a CPM contract can
only be evaluated against all user types lumped together. As an advertiser,
this often presents an unsatisfactory menu of options, as they are forced to
either forego profitable leads or be forced to buy unprofitable ones. When
launched, Google’s Adwords platform quickly sprung to dominance in large
part because the click, as opposed to the impression, was much more effective
at screening user-types in a profit-increasing way. Secondly, these results help
to explain why PPS contracts do not dominate the industry, even though they
are the most incentive-compatible for the publisher. Because the opportunity
cost of each type will vary in ways that do not match the sale-probabilities, a
larger set of alternative, more complex actions are required to both select and
price-discriminate the targeted set of users.
Discussion of Assumptions
The model’s essential results rest squarely on the assumption that the action
space A is large enough to allow the advertiser to choose any pa (t) ∈ P. Previ-
ous treatments have assumed only a small, finite number of actions from which
the advertiser may choose, which necessarily restricts the range of conversion
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rates which might occur. On the other hand, in this model the definition of
P implies that the advertiser has the ability to set precise conversion rates for
all t. While these assumptions are an abstraction from reality, they represents
a reasonable approximation for two reasons. First, publishers and advertisers
have the ability to store and record vast amounts of user activity, where it be
page views, view duration, or information submission. Moreover, as data stor-
age becomes cheaper and more sophisticated, this set of actions continues to
grow. Secondly, the advertiser has many other levers with which to fine-tune
action conversion rates, including the text, graphics, display of the ad, and the
design and layout of the advertiser’s webpage. On the advertisement itself, ad-
vertisers can attract or detract users with varying degrees of aggressive text, or
“creative” [Zhu and Wilbur, 2011]. Similarly, the advertisement’s website can
be laid out to promote or dissuade users from completing the desired action.
With these tools at the advertiser’s disposal, it seems reasonable to assume
that a specified conversion rate may be reasonably achieved.
In practice, if an advertiser does not have this capability, then they
face a variant of a monopolist’s problem. In this scenario, the advertiser will
suffer some profit loss, either by foregoing types that would be profitable if
the cost were r (t), or, paying expenses greater than r (t) for targeted types.
To further illustrate, consider an arbitrary action such that i) ma (t) is strictly
increasing, and ii) p (t) − r (t) is decreasing. These attributes ensure ∃c such
that T (c, a) = [0, t] for any t, and T ∗ = [0, t] for some t.
Assume a fully differentiable action profile, and consider the problem
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according to Proposition 3. Taking



































The left-hand side represents the marginal revenue associated with the
marginal type at the optimum t. The right-hand side represents the marginal















which must be paid across all the preceding types Fa(t). This predicament
is analogous to a monopolist who, when lowering price to increase quan-
tity demanded, must lower prices for all units, not just the marginal unit.
This predicament occurs because the monopolist cannot distinguish consumer
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types (based on their willingness to pay), and thus cannot effectively price-
discriminate. Similarly, the advertiser cannot distinguish the publisher’s user
types. However, unlike a monopolist, the advertiser has two levers to adjust:









decreases, the advertiser can devise an action profile
such that the marginal type can be obtained without increasing costs paid for
all other types. Effectively, the advertiser can price-discriminate each type











/∂t = 0, ensuring that marginal costs remain at r (t). Figure
7a-b shows this dynamic in the standard demand-supply framework. Similar
to monopolist markets, the advertiser ends up with total sales and total profit
lower than what would be achieved with perfect price discrimination.
These arguments demonstrate the increased flexibility the advertisers
achieve by having the choice of both the action and price when decided on
a contract. The more actions that the advertiser has in their choice set, the
more likely they are to find the optimal action profile which both selects and
price-discriminates the desired set of users.
1.3.5 Contracts as risk-sharing agreements
The results of the previous section may suggest that all action profiles
are equivalent so long as they i) successfully separate the targeted users from
the rest, and ii) are constructed so expected payouts always equal r(t). For a
risk-neutral advertiser, that is correct, as there exists, for a given t, infinitely
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many (c, a) such that c = ma (t). To illustrate,
Proposition 1.3.6. If a contract (c, a) ∈ C∗ (T ∗), and if there exists another
action a˜ such that
(
pa˜ (t) ∈ P) ∧ (pa˜ (t) = βpa (t)), then ∃c˜ : (c˜, a˜) ∈ C∗ (T ∗).
Proof. Suggest c˜ = c
β
. Then c˜·pa˜ (t) = c∗·pa∗ (t). If c = ma (t), then c˜ = ma˜ (t),
and if c < ma (t), then c˜ < ma˜ (t). Therefore, (c˜, a˜) ∈ C∗ (T ∗).
To explain, for a given optimal action profile pa (t), all positive scalar
multiples of pa (t) are also optimal, given that they exist in the action space P.
This is because the contract price c will respond in kind to keep c ·pa (t) = r (t)
∀t ∈ T ∗.
However, that is not to say that advertisers are completely indifferent
to the information content of the action profiles in this set.4 For example,
it is observed in the industry that many contracts exist which require deeply
informative actions. Examples include 2-3 page registrations, or even price-
per-sale contracts. One reason that advertisers may prefer more informative
actions to less informative ones may be the desire to exchange risk exposure.
Although expected profits are equal amongst all contracts in the optimal set,
the return-on-investment (ROI), or the ratio of profits to costs, will vary de-
pending on the information content of the action profile. ROI is a key business
4To refresh, pa1 (t) < pa2(t) means pa1 (t) is a more informative action than pa2 (t);
pa (t) = p(t) is the most informative action possible, as it renders the post-action probability
of sale exactly equal to one.
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metric for all advertisers, and the advertiser may seek more or less informative
user actions depending on the advertiser’s risk aversion to variable returns.
To illustrate, it can be shown that as information content of the action
profile increases (that is, as pa(t) decreases from 1 to p(t)), the variance of ROI
is strictly increasing for publishers, while strictly decreasing for advertisers.
Proposition 1.3.7. Consider a targeted population T ∗ = [0, t], and the set
of optimal contracts C∗ (T ∗). If {(c1, a1) , (c2, a2)} ∈ C∗ (T ∗), and pa1 (t) <
pa2 (t) ∀t, then
1. V ar (ROIAd(C1)) < V ar (ROIAd(C2)), and
2. V ar (ROIP (C1)) > V ar (ROIP (C2)).
Proof. Consider a single t ∈ T ∗, and call the return on investment for this
type ROIAd (t, C).









ROI is simply a Bernoulli trial with parameter p(t)
pa(t)
, multiplied by pi
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.









Substitute in: c = ma (t) = r(t)
pa(t)
per Proposition 3:















p (t) (pa (t)− p (t))
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Thus, if pa1 (t) < pa2 (t), then V ar (ROIAd(t, C1)) < V ar (ROIAd(t, C2)).
Since the Bernoulli trial parameter p(t)
pa(t)
are unaffiliated across t ∈ T ∗, V ar (ROIAd(C1)) <
V ar (ROIAd(C2)). As the action profile gets closer to the sale function – ef-
fectively, increasing the post-action probability of sale – the advertiser realizes
less risk around expected return on investment. In the special case where the
pa (t) = p(t), variance is zero.
In the same analysis for publishers, where ROI is considered for just
the portion of traffic driven to the advertiser:
E [ROIP (t, C)] =
cpa (t)
r (t)









pa (t) (1− pa (t)) = 1
pa (t)
−1
Thus, variance of the publisher’s ROI increases with decreases in pa (t). For
the impression-action (pa (t) = pa = 1), variance is zero, since the publisher
receives the contract price c with absolute certainty on a per-view basis.
This model assumes both the advertiser and publisher are risk-neutral agents,
and thus, do not have preferences over the set of optimal action profiles. How-
ever, perhaps an extension of this model might assume one or both risk-averse
parties who would exhibit strict preferences over the profiles which affected
the uncertainty around return-on-investment. In fact, when both parties are
risk-averse, there could exist a risk premium on top of the risk-neutral contract
price to compensate the publisher for increased uncertainty. Such extensions
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are not addressed in this work, but seem to be relevant and interesting ques-
tions for future research.
1.4 Model with Multiple Advertisers
The previous section extensively detailed the baseline model with one
publisher and one advertiser. Another model of interest, particularly to large
publishers who simultaneously negotiate with many advertisers, features one
publisher and many advertisers competing for the same page-space. Such a
scenario currently occurs with large search-companies like Google and Yahoo!,
only in a specialized format, namely where the action profile is restricted to
click only (with heavily regulated copy requirements) and where advertisers
must submit to a generalized second price auction. In this section, the baseline
model is extended to include multiple advertisers, so that each advertiser must
consider competing offers when constructing their own contracts.
Before a formal presentation of each agent’s problem, the terminology of
earnings-per-view (EPV) is introduced. EPV for type t is defined as epv (t) =
c · pa(t), and provides a short-hand description of the publisher’s expected
per-view revenue from a given contract. For reference, in the previous section,
the advertiser optimally structured the action profile so that epv (t) = r (t)
∀t ∈ T ∗. For the advertiser, epv (t) represents per-view expenses associated
with type t.
The model primitives are the same as before, with the extension that
there exists n ≥ 2 advertisers, which in the notation will be indexed by i.
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As before, the publisher allocates each user type to the alternative with the
highest epv (t). In the baseline model, there were two alternatives: the ad-
vertiser’s contract or a reservation r (t). In the extension, the alternatives are
the offered contracts from all advertisers. Therefore, if multiple optimal con-
tracts exist for type t, any convex combination of those contracts will result
in maximum expected profit for the publisher. To standardize the allocation
between multiple competing contracts, this model extension assumes that if
the publisher is indifferent between more than one contract for type t, then
the publisher will split the user-traffic equally across each contract. Consider
vi(t) : T → [0, 1] the decision to offer some percentage between 0 and 1 of
traffic-type t to advertiser i. The publisher’s problem, formally stated given
an array of contracts {Ci}ni=1 is:






vi(t) · epvi (t)
)
dt (1.7)
Denote epv (t) = max {{epvi (t)}ni=1}. Analogous to the baseline model,
the publisher’s solution is:
v∗i (t) =
1 (epvi (t) = epv (t))
|argmax {epv (t)} | (1.8)














The model extension represents a modified case of Bertrand price competition,
with two main features. First, the competing firms are not homogenous; they
sell different products and thus have heterogenous valuations for each type t.
Second, as opposed to a deterministic unit price, the price competition takes
place in the space of expected per-view prices, taking into account a spectrum
of action profiles. Similar to the baseline model, note that for any contract,
the contract price ci is constant across t, while the action-profile p
a
i (t) may
vary. Any precise manipulation of epv (t) must occur through variation in the
action profile, as the contract price will simply raise or lower epv (t) in a similar
fashion across all types, and therefore is a blunter instrument to maneuver.
Holding a contract price ci fixed, any epvi (t) greater than ci · pi(t) can be
achieved through varying pai (t).
Any advertiser i, when evaluating the possibility of targeting type t,
must only take into account the highest epv (t) being offered from all other
advertisers, denoted epv−it. Analogous to standard Bertrand competitions,
and assuming a minimum incremental adjustment of ε, the following best







[0, pi (t) pii] if epv−i (t) > pi (t)pii
epv−i (t) + ε otherwise
For a given type t, an advertiser i can structure the pai (t) such that epvi (t)
just beats the epv(t) of the closest competitor, assuming it is still profitable
to obtain traffic at that expected per-view price. Given the best response
functions for all advertisers, the following “limit pricing” result is achieved:
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Solution
Denote E [pii (t)] = pi (t) · pii.
• epv∗ (t) = E [pi(n−1) (t)]. For any type t, the maximum epv (t) offered,
and the publisher’s expected pre-view revenue, equals the second highest
expected sales revenue from all advertisers. The advertiser with the
highest expected sales revenue need only bid equal to the second highest
to successfully target type t. All other advertisers do not profit off type t,
either because they choose not to compete for that user type, or because
the price at which they must offer epv (t) equals their expected sales
revenue.
• T ∗i = {t : E [pii (t)] ≥ epv∗ (t)}.
C∗i (T ∗i ) = {(ci, ai) : (∀t ∈ T ∗i , epvi (t) = epv (t)) ∧ (∀t /∈ T ∗i , epvi (t) < epv (t))}.
Each advertiser only targets the user types for which their expected sales
revenue is the highest.
• E [ΠP ] =
∫
t
epv∗ (t) dt. The publisher earns the 2nd best expected sales
revenue for each t.
• E [ΠAd(i)] = ∫t v∗i (pi(t)pii − epv∗ (t)) dt. Each advertiser earns profits on
all t for which they have the strictly best expected sales revenue.
1.4.1 Discussion
The model with multiple advertisers presents several interesting con-
clusions, many of which flow naturally as extensions from the baseline model.
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First, the multiple-advertising model provides some insight into the origins of
r (t) in the baseline model. The baseline, which allowed for only one advertiser,
meant that that advertiser was competing against an exogenous alternative for
the publisher. Little legwork was given to explain the existence or valuation
of r (t). In many ways, this was not central to the advertiser’s problem, since
the advertiser had to “beat” the alternative to obtain traffic, regardless of
where the alternative came from. However, in the multiple-advertiser model,
it is clear to see that this alternative comes about from price competition of
other advertisers, and in particular, r (t) represents the next-best contract (on
a revenue per-view basis) for type t. In this regard, r (t) = epv∗ (t).
This model also illuminates the advantage advertisers can gain by being
able to offer promotions to the publisher that are different than competitors.
Note that





If all advertisers are marketing the same products, then they have no
choice but to bid away all the expected-revenue (also referred to as the “sur-
plus”) from each type t. As a result, the publisher receives all the expected
surplus from all user types. However, positive profits can be achieved if the
advertiser promotes a product which, for at least one t, has a higher-expected
revenue than all other competitors. For those types, the advertiser only has to
offer a contract which pays the equivalent of the next-highest valuation, and so
can obtain some positive expected profits. In this case, the publisher receives
a less-than-full portion of the surplus for those types. Therefore, identifying
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products and promotions which can outpace other competitors for at least
some subset of users becomes a key consideration for the advertiser.
Furthering this notion, it also is no longer the case that the advertiser
targets the “best” traffic, which in this model, are user types t which are
smaller in magnitude. The shape of epv∗ (t) is generated as the 2nd-best
per-view offer from all advertisers; however, this does not imply that each
advertiser will always be second, or for that matter, hold a constant ordinal
ranking across all type t. If it is the case that two advertisers exhibit profiles
of E [pii (t)] which intersect at least once, then there will exist intervals of
T where one advertiser will outpace the other in terms of expected revenue,
and vice versa. In particular, for some advertisers, positive profits will be
generated exclusively off of lower-quality traffic (as ranked by E [pi (t)]) because
those types are the only ones in which they can outpace other advertisers and
acquire from the publisher. The user-allocation, e.g. which types go to which
advertiser, depends critically on the relative advertisers’ valuations, and for
some advertisers, lower-revenue types may be the most valuable to obtain.
To illustrate these insights, refer to Figure 8a, which depicts Example
A again, but now includes the existence of a second advertiser that is pro-
moting yoga classes. In the figure, the fantasy football advertiser has values
men-types at $7 and women-types $4, while the yoga class advertiser values
them at $5 and $6, respectively. Therefore, the valuation of yoga classes com-
pared to fantasy football is higher for women than for men. Accordingly, both
advertisers will submit contracts with per-view revenue equal to the minimum
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valuation for each type. When a particular advertiser has a relative advan-
tage, they will gain positive profit on that type, and when that advertiser has
a relative disadvantage, they will earn zero profit. Both advertisers choose
this route because they would lose money if they bid for types above their own
valuation, and need only to match their competitor to attain types where they
hold the advantage. Based on these contracts, the publisher will optimally
choose to show the fantasy football ad on the men’s page, and the yoga class
ad on the women’s page. The yoga class advertiser achieves a positive profit
targeting women because of their relative advantage over the fantasy football
advertiser. In the end, all parties gain some positive profit. The publisher
receives payments from both advertisers, the fantasy football advertiser reaps
profits from sales generated by users on the men’s page, and the yoga class
advertiser reaps profits from sales generated by users on the women’s page.
Figure 8b offers a more generic illustration of this occurrence, again as-
suming just two advertisers. Because E [pi1 (t)] and E [pi2 (t)] intersect once and
only once, the user-spectrum is cleanly split between the two, with each ad-
vertiser obtaining the interval of types where their valuation is highest. Both
advertisers make positive profits with their respective targeted types, since
they only have to offer contracts commensurate with the next best option.
The publisher receives the expected revenue consistent with the next-best op-
tion for all types t, which in general will be smaller (as a portion of the total
surplus) as the gap in expected revenue between advertisers 1 and 2 widens.
These two examples demonstrate how matches are formed in the affiliate mar-
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keting industry. First, clearly an advertiser must be promoting a product
which has some relevance to the publisher’s user population; if not, then the
valuation profile E [pii (t)] would be so small (or null) that the advertiser would
have no ability to compete for user traffic. On the other hand, if the adver-
tiser is promoting a product which is highly correlated or closely aligned with
their competitors, the level of achievable profit will be diminished as well. In
the most extreme case, if an advertiser pitches the exact same product as a
competitor (or more generally, a product with an identical valuation profile
E [pii (t)]), then they stand to achieve zero profit. Therefore, the model sug-
gests that the best, most stable matches occur when an advertiser can promote
a product that is differentiated from its competitors yet still highly relevant
to the publisher.
Lastly, this analysis illuminates once again the advertisers’ necessity
of having an expanded choice set of action profiles when delivering contracts.
Recall that Google’s and other search engines’ generalized second price auc-
tions rank each advertiser buy expected per-view revenue (click-through rate
multiplied by bid), and each ad placement is awarded at the per-view cost
of the next highest bidder.5 However, the search engines commonly allow
just CPC advertising, meaning that each advertiser must compete using the
click-action. This implies that, unless the advertiser can manipulate the click-
through rate to precisely match their valuation of each type, then they will
5This outcome is almost identical to the one achieved in the Bertrand competition de-
tailed above, where the advertiser who wins a particular user type need only bid the valuation
of the 2nd best advertiser.
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be constrained in how they can compete, and how they can minimize costs.
Refer again to Figure 8a. The optimal contract in this example requires that
ma∗ (Men) = ma∗ (Women). If constrained to only clicks, each advertiser
must manipulate their ad such that the click-through probabilities match this
profile. If this cannot be precisely done, then the advertisers will be at some
loss. If the click-through rate is too high for a given type, the advertisers either
bids more than is needed to secure the user type, or bids over their own valu-
ation. If the click-through rate is too low for a given type, the advertiser is in
danger of being unable to win the desired user type. This example showcases
that the restriction to just one or a small set of actions when constructing
contracts means the advertiser may not be able to precisely target a desired
user population at the minimum price. Put another way, the more actions
that an advertiser has at their disposal, the better able they are to craft this
optimal action profile and contract.
In the real world, this insight reveals that advertisers’ ability to compete
for publishers’ ad space depends critically on their access to a wider and more
elaborate set of user actions. Case in point, suppose there exists two advertisers
with the same valuation profile E [pi (t)]. A standard preconception may be
that these two advertisers are equally competitive, given they have the same
expected revenues for all types. However, suppose that one firm is much more
technologically savvy than the other, and has access to structure contracts
and much more detailed and finely-tuned user actions. In this case, the less-
savvy firm would be at a competitive loss, generally speaking, as they would
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not possess the same ability to craft optimal contracts against the publisher’s
per-view reservation prices. Over time, the tech-savvy advertiser would win
out, as they would be able to generate more profit, despite having the same
exact valuation profile.
These arguments highlight both the complexity and the increased flex-
ibility of affiliate marketing contracts, and demonstrate why a rich set of con-
tractible actions is so critical to the advertiser. With a plethora of actions,
advertisers, competing against each other for publishers’ page-space, have an
increased ability to craft contracts that lower their expenses while selecting
out unprofitable user types. As the action set grows, advertisers can fine-tune
this procedure even further. This suggests that matches between an advertiser
and a publisher not only depend on a strong product alignment (differentiated
from competitors, relevant to users) but also on the advertiser’s technological
capability in selecting and crafting optimal action-profiles.
1.5 Model Extensions and Special Cases
The following section will detail several extensions and/or special cases
of the baseline model to implement various features that could be more rep-
resentative of real-world conditions for both publishers and advertisers.
1.5.1 Repeated Game with Default Option
This section presents a repeated-game framework, where the advertiser
has the option to default on payments owed to the publisher for marketing
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services already received. One assumption of the baseline model was that if
a contract were accepted, it would be enforced by both parties. However, in
any one-shot game, there is no incentive for the advertiser to “make good” on
their payments. In a one-time game, once the advertiser receives the users sent
over from the publisher, the advertiser now has an incentive to default on the
payments owed. Moreover, this default decision may not occur immediately,
as many contracts in the affiliate marketing industry are “net 30,” meaning
a month’s worth of leads are invoiced at a time (typically at the end of the
month), and then the advertiser has another 30 days to settle the payment.
In such agreements, there is nontrivial payment risk borne by the publisher,
who can supply up to two month’s worth of leads without scheduled cash
compensation. Therefore, if the advertiser chooses to default, they may receive
up to two month’s of leads without ever having to pay for them. Also, aside
from just all-or-nothing payment, any action that occurs on the advertiser’s
website often cannot be independently observed by the publisher. Thus, the
advertiser also has the incentive to “scrub” the number actions generated, in
an attempt to cheat the publisher and lower costs.
The model will be extended into a repeated game setting, to analyze
how honest accounting and payments might be enforced. Consider the adver-
tiser’s and publisher’s problem over an infinite horizon. Within each period,
the advertiser must decide two things, i) the optimal contract to offer, and
ii) what portion of payments on which to make good once leads are received.
The publisher must decide whether to accept the advertiser’s contract, and
46
importantly, does not observe whether the advertiser has paid until the next
period. Therefore, there is always a one-period opportunity for advertiser to
shirk its costs. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The advertiser offers a contract, C.
2. The publisher either accepts or rejects the contract, and offers leads in
accordance with that contract.
3. The advertiser decides what to pay for the generated leads.
Define the variable dj ∈ [0, 1] to be the portion of the payment the advertiser
will choose to pay. The publisher discounts profits in time period j (relative
to j = 0) by the discount factor βjP . The publisher’s problem is to maximize








(vj(t) · dj · cj · paj (t) + (1− vj(t)) r (t)) dt
}
(1.10)
The advertisers discounts profits in time period j by βjAd. The ad-














First note that, for both the advertiser and publisher, any contract price ci
with a less-than-one payment probability di < 1 is equivalent (in expectation)
to the contract price ci
di
with probability payment equal to one. Intuitively,
if the advertiser defaults on 40% of the payment (d = 0.6), or the advertiser
lowers the contract price by 40%, these two acts result in the same bottom
line for the publisher.
Next, note that the advertiser will always choose to target the same
T ∗ in each period, and that T ∗ equals the optimal user-type interval obtained
in the single-period problem with no default. Recall that in that problem,
the advertiser chooses to target T ∗ = {t : p(t) ≥ r (t)}. For any nonzero
payment probability di > 0, it is never optimal to target any user-type where
p(t) < r (t). This is because the advertiser cannot select which types to make
good, only on whether to honor the whole invoice or not, and therefore there
is some nonzero probability of paying for traffic which will result in expected
loss.
Therefore, the advertiser’s problem reduces to a choice over whether to
default, holding the optimal contract fixed in each period. The single-period
game, repeated infinitely, can be written in normal form as follows:
















v∗ (t) p (t)pidt,
∫
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It is clear to see that in the single-period setting, the unique perfect equilibrium
is (Reject,Default), since (Accept) is a weakly dominated strategy. However,
both parties are (weakly) better off, and the advertiser is strictly better off, by
cooperating. This amounts to a repeated prisoner’s dilemma, where a weakly
better out come can only be obtained through penal enforcement. The “grim
trigger” penal rule to enforce co-operation in the repeated game is presented.
1. For period j = 0, the publisher accepts.
2. j > 0, the publisher accepts if the advertiser pays in full in period j−1. If
advertiser defaults at all in period j−1, the publisher rejects for periods
j, j + 1, ....




v∗ (t) p (t) pidt and r =
∫ 1
0
v∗ (t) r (t) dt. The advertiser’s profits
under (Accept, Pay) are (pi − r), and under (Accept,Default), pi. Under the
publisher’s rule, the advertiser will decide to pay if:
pi − r






− 1 ≥ 1
βAd
− 1
The “grim trigger” rule will enforce cooperation so long as return-on-
investment meets or exceeds the advertiser’s discount rate. Two main conclu-
sions arrive from this result. One, an advertiser with a high discount rate will
optimally choose to default, and simply “grab” the one-time profit boost asso-
ciated with shirking costs for one period. In the affiliate marketing industry,
this tends to occur with firms who are financially unstable, and face significant
liquidity strain to make good on their accounts receivable each month. These
types of advertiser’s quickly leave the industry, as their reputation for non-
payment makes it difficult to work with other publishers. Two, the matching
between advertisers and publishers must be such that the expected revenues
of the targeted user types sufficiently outpace the per-view price. The adver-
tiser is more likely to default if the profit margins (present and future) are
not large enough to incentivize the advertiser to enforce the contract in the
present in order to keep them. This suggests there are limits in the matches
between advertisers and publishers. Marginally profitable contracts are likely
to be rejected because the incentive to default is quite high.
1.5.2 Contracts with Learning
This model extension will assume that the advertiser or publisher does
not know the respective sale- and action-probabilities, and learn over time.
So far, the analysis has assumed that the sale function and a specified action-
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profile is known, but in many cases, contracts are offered to new publishers
with whom p(t) and pa (t) cannot be known exactly, but can be estimated as
leads begin to accumulate. This extension will investigate how the advertiser
should design its contract to incorporate this uncertainty.
Note that the advertiser is interested in all user-types t such that p(t) ≥
r (t). Therefore, the advertiser is interested in identifying some confidence
interval for p(t), or alternatively, testing the null hypothesis that p(t) ≥ r (t).
The analysis begins by assuming that for a given user-space T , the ad-
vertiser has a prior distribution of the sale-probabilities for each t, denoted
µt(p(t)). That is, the advertiser has a subjective distribution over the pos-
sible values of p(t), which is itself a distribution over {0, 1}. Analogous to
the baseline model, if the advertiser can only offer one contract, and never
renegotiate, they will offer a contract which targets the relevant user-types
such that E [µt(p(t))] ≥ r (t). Also, for a given action-profile, there exists a
prior distribution, νt (p
a (t)). Analogous to the baseline model, if the publisher
is only offered one contract, the publisher only promotes the ad to type t if
c = r(t)E[νt(pa(t))]
.
In the framework presented below, the advertiser can observe the per-
formance of user-types in discrete intervals, and update their contract specifi-
cations for the next interval. In practice, most advertisers adopt some version
of this procedure, most notably by first offering a contract for a testing pe-
riod, then, offering a new, permanent contract with an updated distribution of
µt (p(t)). The testing period is used to acquire observations which update the
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prior distributions, and allow for the new contract to be constructed with more
precision, leading to higher expected profits for both parties. This procedure
reveals that there exists a continuation value associated with each posterior
distribution. Call the publisher’s continuation value VP (νt (p
a (t))) and the
advertiser’s continuation value VAd (νt (p
a (t)) , µt (p (t))).
Let us denote each period by subscript j = 0, 1, 2, ..., and the distribu-
tions conditional on history through period j as µt (p(t)) |j and νt (pa (t)) |j,
respectively. The publisher’s problem in period j + 1 (and having observed
history through j) becomes:





[v (t) (c · E [νt (pa (t)) |j]) + (1− v (t)) r (t)] dt+
VP (νt (p
a (t)) |j + 1)} (1.12)
And the advertiser’s problem:
E [ΠAd|j] = maxC∈R+×A{
∫
t
v∗ (t) (E [µt (p(t)) |dj] pi − c · E [νt (pa (t)) |j]) dt+
VAd (νt (p
a (t)) , µt (p (t)) |j + 1)}
(1.13)
The publisher must make inferences on the true profile of pa (t), while
the advertiser must make inferences on both p(t) and pa (t), conditional on the
information obtained through interval j. This naturally requires using Bayes’
rule. Since the random variables S(t) and A (t) follow a binomial distribution
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with parameters p(t) and pa (t), respectively, it is natural and algebraically
convenient to assume the prior distribution follows a beta distribution with
hyper-parameters (αt, βt) for µt (p (t)) and (at, bt) for νt (p
a (t)). Under this
family of distributions, the prior and posterior distributions (after applying
Bayes’ rule) are of the same family, thus allowing for closed-form expressions
for the posterior distribution. Such families are called conjugate distributions,
and the beta distribution is a well-known example.
Lastly, the problem is somewhat complicated by the notion that if a
type t is not targeted, then neither the advertiser nor the publisher can attain
information about type t. This may be unsatisfactory if the prior distribution
for type t is especially disperse, such that additional information will lower the
variance of the posterior distribution dramatically. Both parties are interested
in constructing a binary decision for each type t – for the publisher, whether
to show the ad or not, for the advertiser, whether to target or not. The pub-
lisher, for each t, wishes to test the hypotheses c · pa (t) ≥ r (t), while the
advertiser wishes to test p (t) pi ≥ r (t), as these inequalities determine each
party’s decision. Therefore, it becomes critical to allow for exploration of the
behavior of type t until a test with sufficiently small size can be rejected. The
analysis will assume each party adopts a test of this null hypothesis with size
γ, such that, each party will only make a final decision on each type t with
at least (1− γ) % confidence. This notion is similar to the “explore-exploit”
trade-off inherent in multi-armed bandit problems, for which many approxi-
mated solution strategies have been previously derived. The strategy below
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will be a variant of epsilon-first strategy, except that the exploration phase
is dynamically determined based on the first rejection of the null hypotheses
Tran-Thanh et al. [2010].
Optimal Decisions Under Bayesian Learning
Assume that before the first period, j = 0, the advertiser has a prior distribu-
tion for each t, µt (p (t)) ∼ Beta (α0 (t) , β0 (t)), and the publisher has a prior
distribution for each t, νt (p
a (t)) ∼ Beta(a0, b0). The following procedure de-
tails the optimal decisions for both publisher and advertiser at each interval,
as well as the posterior distribution generation which informs those decisions.
1. Re-arrange types in descending order based on the 1 − γ-percentile of
µt (p (t)) |j = 0, denoted q1−γ [µt (p (t)) |j = 0].
2. For the publisher , choose T ∗ = {t : q1−γ [piµt (p (t)) |j = 0] ≥ r (t)}.
All {t : q1−γ [piµt (p (t)) |j = 0] < r (t)} are not targeted.
3. The contract C∗ = (c∗, a∗) is offered such that ∀t ∈ T ∗, q1−γ [c∗ · νt (pa∗ (t)) |j = 0] =
r (t).
4. After period j = 1 is complete, the publisher and advertiser jointly
observe N1 (t) views and A1 (t) actions for each user-type t ∈ T ∗; the
advertiser also observes the number of sales S1 (t).
5. The publisher updates the prior distribution
(a0 (t) , b0 (t)) = (a0 (t) + A1 (t) , b0 (t) +N1 (t)− A1 (t)).
54
6. The advertiser updates the prior distribution
(α0 (t) , β0 (t)) = (α0 (t) + S1 (t) , β0 (t) +N1 (t)− S1 (t)).
7. Repeat steps 1-6 with prior distribution µt (p (t)) |j = 1, 2, ... and νt (pa (t)) |j =
1, 2, ....
As j → ∞, µt (p (t)) |j → p (t) and νt (pa (t)) |j → pa (t). Thus, the baseline
model can be characterized as the limiting-state of a model with learning.
1.5.3 Finite User-types
The baseline model assumed a spectrum of user-types; in reality, this
may be a strong assumption, given that it would entail the publisher and
advertiser being able to ascertain finely-tuned differences across users. Instead,
it may be more reasonable to assume a finite set of user-types. However, this is
no different that modeling p(t) as a k-step function, to construct k user-types.
That is, a sale function of:
p(t) =

p1 if t ≤ t1
p2 if t1 ≤ t ≤ t2
...
pk tk−1 ≤ t ≤ tk
Where p1 > p2 > ... > pk. Per Proposition 2, only k types can be identified
by the publisher or advertiser. All the results continue to hold, as this is a
special case of the more general model.
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1.6 Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Work
The model presents several results, some which confirm the existing lit-
erature, and some which offer new and somewhat counterintuitive insights into
the optimal structure of affiliate marketing contracts. First, the action-profile’s
ability to raise the ex-post probability of sale and limit “wasteful” spending
is largely a non-issue. In fact, in some cases, actions which have higher ex-
post sale probabilities can be suboptimal if they do not precisely match the
publisher’s opportunity cost. Risk-neutral advertisers are largely indifferent
to the riskiness of an action-profile so long as per-view performance remains
the same. Rather, the benefits of an action-profile lie primarily in the ability
to separate user types into a targeted and non-targeted set of users. Actions
are utilized to target specific users exclusively, by inducing the publisher to
promote to desired users and not to promote to others. Therefore, impressions
are largely ineffective in this regard, and this rigidity may help to explain why
CPM contracts are rarely utilized. Moreover, the advertiser crafts an action
such that for each desired type, the advertiser pays the publisher the minimum
per-view amount needed to induce the publisher to agree. This speaks to the
dual nature of actions, both to separate the user traffic while also minimizing
expenses. When there are many different user types, each with varying worth
to both the advertiser and publisher, achieving both of these goals requires
a rich set of contractible actions. This main result offers a novel explanation
behind the diversity of action-based contracts in the industry.
In the extended model with multiple advertisers, advertisers must en-
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gage in expected per-view Bertrand price competition, and the publisher enjoys
the added revenue associated with the limit pricing of their user types. As a
special case, if all advertisers sell the same product, the publisher earns the
advertisers’ entire sales revenue; on the other hand, an advertiser can only
earn positive profits if their per-view valuations are higher than all other com-
petitors for at least one user type. This suggests that the most competitive
advertisers will be ones who promote products that are differentiated from
others, while still be relevant and profitable within the user population. It
is also the case that some advertisers will explicitly and deliberately target
low-quality users if they have a relative advantage over those types. This may
help to explain why particular goods or services do well for some publishers
even if those goods or services are deemed inferior by a broad swath of other
publishers and traditional media. In sum, the model arrives at results which
offer profound insight on advertisers’ strategy and corroborate many stylized
facts about the online affiliate marketing industry.
This paper provides two contributions to the current literature on affili-
ate marketing contracts. First, the model provides a formal, general economic
treatment of the affiliate contract problem using microeconomic theory, by
specifying primitives on user behavior, and publisher and advertiser prefer-
ences. The development of a rich action-space allows for a broader analysis
of action-based contracts. Since the literature is largely rooted in analyzing
just two or three different alternatives, previous models cannot comment on
how a larger set of action affects firms in the industry. As the set of identi-
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fiable user actions continues to grow, the generalized framework offered here
will prove to be more useful than models which assume only a small set of
pre-existing actions. Moreover, by introducing user heterogeneity and asym-
metric information, the model accounts for selection implications associated
with action-profile choices which have not yet been extensively analyzed. Sec-
ond, this paper offers a novel explanation on the diversity of actions used in
the affiliate marketing industry. To illustrate, advertisers with only a limited
set of actions with which to incorporate into a contract will be constrained in
their ability to perfectly match the publisher’s reservation prices for the user
types they wish to target, and therefore will suffer inefficiencies either in their
selection of users or in the prices they must pay to attain those users. Finally,
this framework can be applied to other environments with agent heterogeneity
and asymmetric information as well. Below are two examples:
EXAMPLE D: A firm is looking to hire from a heterogenous
pool of workers. Workers are of different types, t, which put
forth constant effort but produce varying output for the firm with
expected value, y (t). Meanwhile, each type has varying reser-
vation wages, r (t), and the firm wishes to hire all types such
that T ∗ = {t : y (t) ≥ r (t)}. However, the firm cannot distin-
guish worker types, so it must construct a performance-based con-
tract to target the right workers while also minimizing labor costs.
A contract based which pays a fixed amount, w, conditional on
an observable performance benchmark, B (t), such that ∀t /∈ T ∗,
w · P (B(t) = 1) < r (t), and ∀t1, t2 ∈ T ∗, mB (t1) = mB (t2), will
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effectively target the profitable workers while paying them no more
than r (t) in expectation.
EXAMPLE E: A university is recruiting students to enroll. Stu-
dents are of different types, t, with varying enrollment rates, e (t).
The university makes pi in net revenue off of each enrollment. The
university contracts with recruiters who know the student types.
For the recruiters, each type has a different recruiting cost, r (t),
in terms of time and effort. The optimal contract offered by the
university to the recruiter will be based on an enrollment bench-
mark which occurs with probability pe (t), such that the recruiters
only recruit types T ∗ = {t : pie (t) ≥ r (t)} are only paid r (t) in
expectation.
As the examples illustrate, the modeling framework presented here is quite
robust to other environments where asymmetric information and adverse se-
lection play a role.
This model also comes with distinct limitations which could be en-
hanced with future work. For instance, the assumption that the choice of
action-profiles is infinite may be too broad, and so further results which can
identify optimal strategies over a general, but finite set of action profiles may
prove useful. For example, a treatment where action-profiles are finite, and the
advertiser must choose the profile which best matches the unconstrained profile
would be of interest, particularly as it relates to implementability. Secondly,
the featured model here was static, and represented a steady-state environment
59
where full valuations and action-profiles were known. Extending the model to
a dynamic setting, where agents must manage noisy information about these
primitives, financial risks, and relationship considerations with other partners,
would present a more realistic scenario as it pertains to this industry. Thirdly,
analyzing the predictions of this model empirically would also demonstrate
a valuable contribution. While aggregate data on affiliate marketing arrange-
ments are not abundant, there exist many large affiliate networks6 – exchanges
between publisher and advertisers – which may possess the volume of breadth
of data necessary to investigate advertisers’ strategy on a broad scale.
6Examples include Commission Junction and LinkShare.
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Figure 1: An illustration of the interactions between an internet
user, the publisher, and the advertiser. The publisher’s role is to
display the advertisement on behalf of the advertiser. The user
visits the publisher’s website, and then may or may not proceed
to engage the advertiser through the display ad. Depending on
the terms of the contract, the publisher receives payment from
the advertiser upon, among others, the display of the ad (pay-
per-impression), a user click of the ad (pay-per-click, or PPC), a
pre-specified user action which classifies the user as a lead (PPA),
or a user purchase (PPS).
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user visits publisher’s site
impression occurs with prob. 1
user observes ad with prob pa11− pa1
$0
$0











actions 4 to n− 1
$0
purchases with prob p
pan−11− ppan−1
$pi
Figure 2a: An illustration of the user “funnel” from an impression
to a sale, assuming n distinct, post-impression actions. In this
example, the user receives an impression of the ad with probability
one. Ex ante, the user can observe the ad with probability pa1 ,
click the ad with probability pa2 , register with the advertiser with
probability pa3 , and eventually purchase (the nTh. action) with
probability p. The probability of sale conditional on any action i is
p
pai
, and must be weakly increasing in i. The “funnel” framework
mandates that all actions be completed sequentially, such that the








Figure 2b: An illustration of a generic sale-profile and various
action-profiles. The horizontal axis is the domain of t ∈ T = [0, 1],
and the vertical axis is the probability space over binary outcomes.
The grayed area is the space of all potential action-profiles, P. P
is bounded above by pa(t) = 1, which is an “impression,” and












































Figure 3a-e: An illustration of various specifications of pa(t) and
their corresponding T (c, a).
(a) The impression-based action, where pa(t) = κ, and T (c, a) = ∅
∀c < r
κ
, and T (c, a) = T ∀c ≥ r
κ
.
(b) pa(t) has discrete jumps, but constant wherever continuous;
T (c, a) has a step-up shape.
(c) pa(t) is decreasing with discrete jumps; T (c, a) has periodic
plateaus but otherwise increasing.
(d) pa(t) is continuous, but constant over some intervals, in which
case T (c, a) has periodic jumps.






pc (Men) = 0.9
pc (Women) = 0.6
pi (Men) = pi (Women) = 1
Men Women
Figure 4: A simple example with two types: men and women.
Men and both more likely to purchase as well as click the ad. With
r(Men) = r(Women) = r, the impression action-profile pi (·) can-
not separate men from women with any contract price. However,
using the click action-profile pc (·), the advertiser can target men




). If men are optimally targeted,







r(M) = r(W ) = $6
pi = $24
mi (M) = mi (W ) = $6






Figure 5: An illustration of expected profits as a function of the
contract price c, for both the click and impression action-profiles.
With the impression contract, the advertiser can only target both
men and women, or neither. However, with r = $6 and pi = $24,
targeting women is not profitable. With the click action, the adver-
tiser can target men exclusively, and optimally does so by setting
c∗ = mc (M) = $6
0.9
. The unprofitability of women is illustrated at
c = mc (W ) = $6
0.6
, where aggregate profit discontinuously drops as
women are included in the targeted set. By being able to target
men exclusively, the advertiser achieves higher profits ($6.66) than
would be achieved with impressions ($4.8) because the publisher





r(M) = r(W ) = $6
p(M) = 0.8 , p(W ) = 0.3
pc(M) = 0.9 , pc(W ) = 0.6
mi (M) = mi (W ) = $6






Figure 6a: An illustration of expected profits as a function of the
contract price c, for both the click and impression action-profile.
If p (Women) = 0.3, then T ∗ = {M,W}, and the impression,
not the click, is optimal. This is because with the click action,
mc (Men) < mc (Women), so the advertiser has to offer a higher
contract price (c = $10) to target women, resulting in higher per-
view costs for men. With the impression action, the advertiser can
pay per-view costs of $6, equal to r, to obtain both traffic types,





r(M) = $6,r(W ) = $5
p(M) = 0.8 , p(W ) = 0.3
pc(M) = 0.9 , pc(W ) = 0.6
mi (W )
mi (M)
mc (M) mc (W )
ms (M)








Figure 6b: An illustration of expected profits as a function of the





, neither impressions ($14.4), clicks
($13.9), nor sales ($13.2) can perfectly price-discriminate the two
types. The optimal action is such that ma∗ (M) = ma∗ (W ), and




User Types, t ∈ [0, 1]
p(t)pi − r(t)











target with increasing ma (t)
Expected
Profits
Figure 7a-b: Illustration of optimal type-targeting by the pub-
lisher. In (a), by choosing the optimal contract, the advertiser
does not target types for whom marginal benefits do not exceed
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marginal costs (r (t)). In (b), the choice of any increasing r(t)
pa(t)
re-
sults in increasing marginal costs, reducing the set of targeted user












Figure 8a: Illustration of optimal contract, traffic allocation, and
expected profits under Example A with two advertisers. The fan-
tasy football (F.F.) advertiser has relatively higher valuations for
men than women, while the opposite holds for yoga class (Y.C.) ad-
vertiser. Each advertiser submits a contract which offers per-view
revenue of epv∗ (t) to the publisher, which in this case is the inferior
advertiser’s expected value for each type. The fantasy football ad-
vertiser gains positive profit on men-types, equal to the difference
between the two valuations, while the yoga class advertiser earns












User Types, t ∈ [0, 1]
Figure 8b: Illustration of optimal contract, traffic allocation, and
expected profits under Bertrand price competition with two firms.
Each advertiser chooses a contract price and action-profile such
that earnings-per-view are equal to the minimum between each ad-
vertiser’s expected revenue from type t. This amount becomes r(t),
the reservation price and the expected revenue for the publisher.
Advertiser 1 enjoys positive profits on all t such that expected rev-
enue exceeds that of advertiser 2, while advertiser 2 enjoys similar
positive profits for all other traffic types.
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Chapter 2
Energy Savings and The Rebound Effect with
Multiple Energy Services and Efficiency
Correlation
Joint with Michael F. Blackhurst1
2.1 Introduction
Energy efficiency has been promoted by a host of policy organizations
as a cost effective means for reducing energy use and respective externalities
NRC [2009], EPA [2008]. Over the last several decades, energy efficiency pro-
grams, standards, and policies have become increasingly common at private
municipalities and all levels of government. There are nearly 1,500 energy
efficiency programs in the U.S., and most programs administer efficiency by
providing financial incentives for technology adoption DSIRE [2013]. Spending
on demand-side management more than doubled between 2005 and 2010 EIA
[2013a], perhaps buoyed by an $11B Federal investment in energy efficiency as
part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 EIA [2013c].
1Extensive portions of this chapter have been previously published as Ghosh, Neal K.,
and Michael F. Blackhurst. “Energy savings and the rebound effect with multiple energy
services and efficiency correlation.” Ecological Economics 105 (2014): 55-66.
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Supporting arguments for efficiency often assume energy demand re-
ductions are driven exclusively by changing the technical operating efficiency
of durable goods NRC [2009], EPA [2008], Creyts [2007], i.e., an increase
in efficiency leads to an equivalent decrease in energy use (∆Efficiency =
−∆Energy). These approaches are often called “bottom-up” or “engineer-
ing economic” assessments because they apply engineering analysis to assess
individual technologies. Bottom-up assessments often rank-order efficient tech-
nologies by the levelized cost of energy saved, then estimate the technically fea-
sible energy saved assuming all technologies in a given market are replaced or
retrofitted, a format often called a “conservation supply curves.” Recent appli-
cations of bottom-up assessments include NRC [2009], Creyts [2007], Azevedo
[2009], Blackhurst et al. [2011].
However, neoclassical economics indicates consumers respond to effi-
ciency (an implicit decrease in the price of energy services) by increasing
quantity demanded, eroding some of the technically feasible savings (a be-
havior termed the “rebound effect”). The rebound effect for households is
typically divided into direct and indirect effects. The direct rebound effect is
the behavioral change following an efficiency improvement for a single end-
use. The direct effect is defined as the elasticity of a single energy service
with respect to its own efficiency, and is typically derived by differentiating







































where E denotes the energy input, while S denotes energy services, and ε
denotes efficiency. The “engineering economic” approach assumes ηε(S) =
0, modeling the elasticity of energy use with respect to efficiency as unity
(e.g. ∆Efficiency = −∆Energy). Equation 1 is conceptually appealing in
demonstrating that some efficiency gains are “taken back” as additional energy
services and has informed much of the literature on the direct rebound effect
Sorrell et al. [2009], Greene [2012]. On the other hand, the indirect effect for
households is typically attributed to re-spending on other goods and services,
largely due to an increase in purchasing power caused by the decrease in the
effective-price of energy (in economics, this is referred to as the “income”
effect). Since energy (and carbon) is used in the supply chain of essentially
any good and service, re-spending will erode the net effects of efficiency. In
combination with broader structural shifts for producers, these re-spending
patterns can lead to “economy-wide” rebound affects Azevedo et al. [2012],
Herring et al. [2009]. On these grounds, researchers and policy makers have
emphasized that rebound challenges the efficacy of efficiency to reduce net
energy consumption Alcott [2010], Jenkins et al. [2011], Barker et al. [2009].
Literature reviews show wide ranges in magnitudes for the direct re-
bound from nearly 0 to 100% Sorrell et al. [2009]; however, considerable vari-
ation in methods, study samples, and research quality may explain these in-
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consistent results. In particular, previous researchers suggest higher rebound
for lower income households due to higher expected marginal utility for energy
services. By assuming the price of energy is exogenous and efficiency changes
are constant, some researchers assert that the direct rebound, ηε (S), is ap-
proximately negative of the own-price elasticity of demand for energy services:
ηε (S) = −ηp (E) Greene [2012], Sorrell et al. [2009], Binswanger [2001]. These
assumptions serve as the basis for much of the empirical estimates of direct
rebound.
Research on indirect rebound is more sparse. Binswanger [2001] con-
ceptually challenged restricting rebound analyses to a single-service, applying
indifference curves to qualitatively demonstrate that indirect rebound may be
much larger for energy-intensive substitutes and that the income effect may
be much more significant than price responses. More recently, Saunders [2013]
echoed this sentiment. A few studies use Equation 1 to estimate the increase
in expenditures (income and substitution effects) following discrete efficiency
changes Thomas and Azevedo [2013], Freire-Gonza´lez [2011]. These studies
using environmentally extended input-output analysis to empirically estimate
indirect rebound as the energy embodied in the production of goods and ser-
vices associated with an increase in expenditures following a discrete efficiency
change. These studies estimate the magnitude of “direct + indirect” effects
ranging from 30%-40% for the U.S. and 30%-50% for Spain.
Several researchers emphasize that technical change can also increase
time efficiency, especially for transportation services. Binswanger discusses
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two rebound effects for time saving technologies. First, time saving technolo-
gies often require more energy to increase the speed of service, as demonstrated
by faster transportation modes. Second, since time is a constraint similar to
income, time saving technologies produce substitution effects similar to an
income increase. Jalas [2002] emphasized this latter effect in estimating the
potential rebound from a time savings services for Finish households. While
the author acknowledges empirical limitations, results suggest some time sav-
ings interventions – like eating out and using cars for shopping - might produce
a rebound.
The above models of rebound are limited to a discrete efficiency change
for a single service. However, households are subject to ongoing, positively cor-
related efficiency improvements within and across end uses. While exogenous
to households, Federal efficiency standards for a broad array of end-uses have
consistently increased over the last several decades. Endogenous, positively
correlated efficiency change is also observed in above-code technology choices.
The average U.S. household has three above-code efficient technologies in-
stalled; 40% have more than five; 90% have more than two. Figure 1 indicates
that above code technologies installations and consistent above code installa-
tions increase with income EIA [2012]. The energy technology installations
in Figure 1 reflect installations across different energy services that are not
mutually exclusive.
For the purposes of this paper, we call consistent, positively correlated
exogenous and endogenous efficiency change “efficiency correlation.” While the
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literature demonstrates limited insight into the underlying behaviors driving
endogenous change, there is some intuition behind this occurrence: a house-
hold preferring one above-code efficient technology is likely to prefer others.
Or, in a more dynamic framework, households might use the savings generated
from one upgrade to invest in another (or perhaps compensate by leveraging
efficiency gains in one end use for another). Efficiency correlation challenges
the single service models of rebound dominant in the literature, i.e., models
assuming efficiency changes for only one end-use. Does this marginal change
increase or decrease the rebound effect? Answers to this question involve sev-
eral potential behavioral responses. Some consumer re-spending is associated
with additional efficiency improvements (a reduction in real income), which
then induces a subsequent improvement in technical efficiency (a decrease in
price and increase in real income) and thus additional rebound.
The primary objectives of this paper are to (1) develop a generalized
microeconomic model of the rebound effect that includes distinct but simul-
taneous efficiency changes for two energy services; (2) apply the model to
estimate the potential for rebound across the residential and transportation
sectors; and (3) demonstrate the importance of considering efficiency changes
across multiple energy services when modeling and empirically estimating re-
bound. The scope of our analysis thus includes the direct rebound effect as well
as the indirect effect associated with consumption of a single, second energy
service.
Our model more represents more realistic efficiency change and ob-
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served technology choices that are more complicated and nuanced than models
assuming discrete efficiency changes for a single-service, such as those reflected
in the direct rebound literature and some indirect rebound models. In par-
ticular, total energy rebound can vary not only with the substitutability of
different energy goods, but also to the degree that efficiency improvement
may occur disproportionately across end-uses and sectors.
2.2 Theory
2.2.1 Motivation
As mentioned previously, one limitation of previous models is the as-
sumption of stand-alone, independent efficiency upgrades in one energy in-
put. However, considerable evidence suggests that many households choose
to make efficiency upgrades across many different inputs, what we call “effi-
ciency correlation.” Under efficiency correlation, the single-service model may
not accurately capture the full response in energy services.
Consider household demand for two energy services (Ei, Ej) with prices
(pi, pj) for a household with income M and energy-efficiency levels (εi, εj).
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The above derivation demonstrates the full partial effect of efficiency
on energy use, taking into account potential endogenous responses to all argu-
ments within the demand function. Given that energy prices are determined
by aggregate supply and demand and not individual efficiency choices, we can





= 0. Moreover, given that the annuitized cost of
efficiency improvements is small and represents a trivial component of income,
we can abstract from income changes and assume ∂M
∂εi
= 0. Thus, the full
























The above derivation demonstrates how the total energy response can






















. For the purposes of this paper, we will
characterize three models which represent special and generalized cases of
Equation (2).
• Model I. The engineering-economic approach would predict no change
in energy services due to changes in εi, such that ηεi(Ei) = −1 and












• Model II. A neoclassical approach captures direct effects and in some
cases, indirect effects, but considers efficiency changes in isolation. This





• Model III. A model with efficiency correlation, but which only includes
the technical response from a secondary energy service. That is, no
behavioral responses from the secondary efficiency change exist. This is










• Model IV. A model with efficiency correlation, and the general model
detailed in (2).
Model IV, which we will formally present in the next section, is a more
general model than I, II, and III. We will intermittently refers to the Models
I-IV throughout the paper to compare and contrast the characterizations and
magnitudes of different behavioral responses. Of particular note, is the relative
differences in responses between Models II, III, and IV, since these differences
represent that impact of efficiency correlation.
2.2.2 Model
Our objectives are to consider the impacts of efficiency correlation on
rebound. To do so, it is imperative to develop a model with multiple energy
sources, such that households evaluate not only total energy consumption,
but also the trade-off between each energy source, with plausibly different
efficiencies. Furthermore, given that households do not value energy itself,
rather, consider a factor of production for consumption goods, any appropriate
model must consider some sort of household production.
The model we present here is philosophically rooted in Becker’s house-
81
hold production model Becker [1965], and consistent with similar models ex-
ploited in the literature Binswanger [2001]. Households value consumption,
represented as a composite good Y , and produce consumption using a variety
of inputs. In this regard, the household takes the guise of a firm, and must
weigh the productivity of each input against its price. For our model, we
consider three inputs: electricity work (C), transportation work (T ), and a
composite input representing all other factors (X). Furthermore, we consider
a household production function with constant elasticity of substitution:
Y =
[




α = (αC , αT ) are share parameters for both energy inputs, and σ is
the elasticity of substitution. Generally, the elasticity of substitution between

















, and reflects how, in
percentage terms, the ratio of inputs would change due to a change in the rel-
ative price. Production functions with constant substitution of elasticity were
originally analyzed for the 2-factor case by Solow [1956] and then Arrow et al.
[1961]. Uzawa [1962] showed that when generalized to n factors, the constant
elasticity of substitution property need not be maintained; however, we show
in Proposition 3 that this property is preserved in our model. The constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) production function is a standard modeling as-
sumption in neoclassical microeconomics. Intuitively, this assumption restricts
the household to a constant (again, in percentage terms) trade-off betweens
all inputs. To the extent that agents do not gain direct utility from particular
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factors of production, this is perhaps a harmless assumption. On the other
hand, there may be lower and upper bounds on certain inputs, for example,
a lower bound on miles driven in each week, which would alter substitution
elasticities, particularly at extremes. Certainly, a CES production function
would be a poor assumption in these scenarios. However, we will continue
with this assumption in concurrence with the literature, and discuss potential
issues in a later sections.
Electricity work is created through electric energy, scaled by electric
energy efficiency, or C = εCEC . Similarly for transportation, T = εTET . The
household has preferences over Y , represented by a concave, twice-continuously
differentiable function, U(·). As will be shown, these properties are all that are
required for our main results to hold. The household faces a budget constraint:
pxX + pCEC + pTET ≤M (2.4)
Without loss of generality, we normalize pX = 1, so that energy prices
are relative, and income M is deflated by the composite input price. The
household’s problem is to maximize utility, U(Y ), with real income M and
relative prices p = (1, pC , pT ). The model is formally defined as follows:
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V (M, p, εC , εT ) = max
EC ,ET ,X
{U(Y )} : (2.5)
M ≥ X + pCEC + pTET (2.6)
C = εCEC (2.7)
T = εTET (2.8)
Y =
[




0 ≤ (X,EC , ET ) (2.10)
2.2.3 Model Properties and Elasticities
Proposition 1 presents the demand functions for each input, i.e., the
result of the household’s problem described by Equations 5-10. The resulting
demand functions are similar to standard demand functions for CES produc-
tion, with a minor exception. In our model, the household does not choose
energy services directly; rather, they choose energy itself (e.g., that which is
displayed on a utility bill), which becomes a factor of production once scaled
by efficiency. Therefore, the functions are slightly modified from standard
CES functions. Interestingly, the demand functions are independent of U(·),
so long as U(·) is concave and twice-continuously differentiable.
Proposition 2.2.1. If U(·) is concave and twice-continuously differentiable,







































Before examining the effect of efficiency correlation on rebound, we con-
sider the properties of the CES structural representation proposed in Proposi-
tion1 for simple and extreme cases to build intuition for modeling two energy
services. Proposition 2 shows the own price elasticity of demand for energy
service i. Proposition 2 indicates that the own price elasticity of demand for
energy service is the substitution elasticity that has been adjusted by the bud-
get share. To explain, consider two extreme cases. First, in the single-good
case, the budget share equals one, in which the price elasticity collapses to
one, regardless of σ. This is because with one-service, demand must reduce
one-to-one with a price increase in order to satisfy the budget constraint. On
the other hand, consider a continuous spectrum of services, such that any in-
dividual service has a budget share of zero. In this case, the substitution and
price elasticity are equal. In our analysis, we observe budget shares for energy
inputs which are small but nonzero. Thus, the price elasticities are bounded
between σ and 1.






We can interpret the substitution parameter σ as the “flexibility” home-
owners have in substituting across each energy service. Again, consider some
simple examples. If homeowners have zero flexibility (σ = 0), then relative
price changes do not spur households to substitute away from the relatively
expensive end-use, so households’ optimal mix of energy services remains un-
changed. These are the responses that would be predicted in Model I, and
the price elasticity is simply the budget share, indicating that a price decrease
will lead to a share’s worth of consumption increase for all inputs. If σ = 1,
then households respond completely to relative price changes. A drop in price
results in an exact increase in consumption, leaving nominal consumption un-
changed. If σ > 1, the price elasticity will be much larger than 1, reflecting the
greater “flexibility” homeowners have in substituting across energy services in
maximizing utility.
Proposition 2.2.3. The elasticity of substitution between {EC , X}, {X,ET},
{EC , ET} is constant at σ.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.2.4 Rebound with No Efficiency Correlation
Direct Efficiency Elasticity and Rebound. Proposition 4 shows the elas-
ticity of energy service i, with respect to its own efficiency and the direct
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rebound effect without any secondary effects of efficiency correlation. Obser-
vation of Proposition 2 shows that ηεi(Ei) = −ηpi(Ei)− 1, which makes sense
given the elasticity of energy with respect to efficiency ought to be compara-
ble to the price elasticity (the ratio pi
εi
represents the effective price of energy
services). This result also compliments the common practice of using a price
elasticity to approximate rebound for the single-service model.






(σ − 1). The rebound effect is rεi(Ei) = ηεi(Ei) + 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
Cross-Service Efficiency Elasticity and Indirect Rebound. When the
efficiency of Ei increases, not only does this decrease the effective price Ei,
but it also increases the purchasing power (the income effect) over all goods
and services (more colloquially called “re-spending” in some rebound research).
The cross-service elasticity of efficiency, ηεi(Ej), shown in Proposition 5 reflects
this re-spending. Intuitively, the sign of ηεi(Ej) is opposite that of the own
efficiency elasticity (Proposition 4), as reductions of energy service j cannot
be achieved from additional spending on Ej in the case where the technical
efficiency of j does not change. Without technical change in j, ηεi(Ej) is
equivalent to indirect rebound
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Proposition 2.2.5. The cross-efficiency elasticity of Ej with respect to effi-





(σ − 1). Assuming efficiency changes are inde-
pendent, the rebound effect is rεi(Ej) = ηεi(Ej).
Proof. See Appendix.
Total Energy Elasticity. Proposition 6 shows the total rebound effect
(direct plus indirect effects) as the elasticity of net energy use (E = Ei +
Ej) with respect to efficiency change for a single end-use i. Proposition 6.1
indicates that the net energy elasticity is the sum of direct and indirect effects
weighted by their respective energy shares. Similarly, Proposition 6.3 indicates
the “direct + indirect” rebound effect is the direct and indirect effects weighted
by their respective energy service shares. To connect this equation to the
traditional “take-back” perspective, we present Proposition 6.2. Proposition
6.2 shows that the elasticity of total energy use is simply the sum of technically-
driven change (elasticity under technical change alone would equal -1), minus
the portions “taken back” and returned to energy services (direct and indirect
terms), all weighted by their respective shares of energy use.
Proposition 2.2.6. Define the total energy elasticity with respect to efficiency
εi as ηεi(E).























We now consider the generalized conditioned of primary interest: the
influence of efficiency correlation across both energy services i and j. Propo-
sitions 7.1-2 show that the energy elasticity for one service includes both the
direct rebound and secondary, indirect effect associated with efficiency cor-
relation. For Proposition 7.1, efficiency improvements in j follow efficiency
improvements for i (ηεi(εj) > 0). As a result, technical change in j induces
additional spending on energy service i, which is the cross-service efficiency
elasticity, ηεj(Ei). The product of these two, ηεi(εj) · ηεj(Ei), is the indirect
rebound effect of these secondary efficiency changes. Proposition 7.2 follows
similar logic but for energy service j.
Proposition 2.2.7. Define ηεi(εj) as the efficiency-correlation elasticity. If
there is efficiency correlation, then:
1. ηεi,ec(Ei) = ηεi(Ei) + ηεi(εj)ηεj(Ei)
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2. ηεi,ec(Ej) = ηεi(Ej) + ηεi(εj)ηεj(Ej)
















































4. rεi,ec(Ei) = rεi(Ei) + ηεi(εj)rεj(Ei)
5. rεi,ec(Ej) = rεi(Ej) + ηεi(εj)rεj(Ej)







The net energy elasticity under efficiency correlation is the sum of the
standard energy elasticity, ηεi(E), as determined in Proposition 6, plus the in-
duced response from technical change in the second end-use, ηεj(E), weighted
by the magnitude of efficiency-correlation elasticity, ηεi(εj). This is a com-
mon refrain in the derivations that reflect efficiency correlation. Under effi-
ciency correlation, each energy elasticity (and by extension, rebound effect) is
augmented by the subsequent efficiency changes in other end-uses, amplified
by the relative efficiency correlation across services, ηεi(εj). Thus efficiency-
correlation elasticity becomes a critical parameter in determining how much
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incremental change in energy use is induced. The more disproportionate ef-
ficiency is across end-uses (increasing ηεi(εj)), the more influential these sec-
ondary effects of efficiency correlation become.
Propositions 7.3a-b show the total energy use elasticity in the “take-
back” perspective. Proposition 7.3a groups the full elasticity into the first-
order elasticity from the original efficiency change, plus the second-order elas-
ticity from the endogenous efficiency change multiplied by efficiency-correlation
elasticity. Each “full” elasticity, both first- and second-order, are comprised
of technical, direct, and indirect responses. This proposition looks similar
to 6(b), with the exception that terms associated with correlated-efficiency
changes are included for the technical change, direct rebound, and indirect
rebound. This presentation illustrates how efficiency-correlation can increase
the number of channels through which households can erode energy savings
through behavioral responses. On the other hand, Proposition 7.3b groups the
first- and second-order responses together into technical, direct, and indirect
effect categories. In this grouping, we can see that each category of responses
is augmented by efficiency correlation. Proposition 7.4-6 present analogues
rebound derivations with efficiency correlation.
Table 1 summarizes the derivations above to clarify the connection be-
tween direct rebound as traditionally measured and the total elasticity deriva-
tions, both with and without efficiency-correlation.
We demonstrate our model by considering rebound within and across
residential electricity end-use consumption (denoted by subscript C) and per-
91
sonal transportation by a vehicle using a conventional gasoline-powered inter-
nal combustion engine (denoted by subscript T ). The following sequence of
technical change and respective economic responses summarizes this applica-
tion with an initial improvement in the efficiency of residential electricity end
uses.
1. First-order technical elasticity. This is the engineering-driven change in
energy use, assuming no behavioral response, and equals -1 times the
relative share of electricity.
2. Direct rebound effect. Electricity services is effectively cheaper, resulting
in increased consumption. The increase in energy use is rεC (EC) × ECE ,
or the direct rebound effect multiplied by electricity’s share of overall
energy use.
3. Cheaper electric services results in increased purchasing power, and in-
duces income effects for cross-sector services like transportation. This
first-order “indirect” rebound effect is rεC (ET )× ETE .
4. Increased energy savings and cheaper energy services lead to higher
real income, and induce the household to upgrade transportation effi-
ciency. Relative to electricity, this percent increase is ηεC (εT ). Thus
total energy use is furthered decreased by the technical change associ-
ated with transportation as a result of efficiency correlation, and is equal
to ηεC (εT )×−1× ETE .
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5. Efficiency increases in transportation lead to increase in transportation
consumption due to the effective decrease in price. This increase is equal
to ηεC (εT )× rεT (ET )× ETE .
6. Cheaper transportation services induce further income effects, and in-
creases consumption of electricity services. This increase is equal to
ηεC (εT )× rεT (EC)× ECE .
Each effect from 2-3, 5-6 incrementally erodes the first-order (step 1)
and second-order (step 4) technical savings.
2.3 Empirical Analysis and Assumptions
Elasticity of Substitution. We estimate the elasticity of substitution by
observing price elasticities previously estimated in the literature, and back-
ing out σ using Proposition 2 (for both electricity and gasoline). Nationally
averaged consumer expenditures survey data BLS [2011] were used to esti-
mate budget shares for electricity and gasoline at 2.3% and 4.3%, respectively.
Short- and long-run price elasticity data were taken from literature reviews
Dahl [1993], Graham and Glaister [2002], Brons et al. [2008]. Based upon
these data, we assume short- and long-run elasticities of substitution to be
0.15 and 0.9, respectively. Table 2 summarizes these estimates.
Nominal Energy Shares. For the first half of the results section, we
present rebound estimate conditional on income, based on the heterogeneity
in nominal energy shares. Nominal energy shares were calculated by income
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using the consumer expenditures survey. Households were grouped into $5000
buckets based on annual income. The average nominal share for both gasoline
and electricity consumption were taken, along with the standard deviation
within each group. Finally, both the point-estimates and standard deviations
were smoothed across income buckets using the Hodrick-Prescott filter Hodrick
and Prescott [1997].2Of note, nominal consumption of both gasoline and elec-
tricity decline with income; consistent with Proposition 4 and 5, the rebound
effect will decrease with income as well. We emphasize that these expendi-
tures describe consumption bundles for a range of consumers that may or may
not exhibit efficiency correlation. Consumers that make consistent efficiency
choices, perhaps because of underlying environmental values, may also spend
differently. Several studies suggest mixed results for self-reported behavioral
changes for early adopters of solar photovoltaic panels Schweizer-Reis et al.
[2000], Keirstead [2007], McAndrews [2011]. However, such studies do not
cover efficiency technologies and do not provide consumption information.
Real Energy Shares. To convert nominal energy shares into real energy
shares, we use the price ratio of gasoline and electricity. Historical nationally
and regionally averaged retail prices for electricity and gasoline (in units of
$/delivered energy) are used to estimate these price ratios. Gasoline prices are
2HP (Hodrick-Prescott) filters, while developed and typically used for trend-filtering in
time-series data, can be applied to any discrete-interval space with sequential ordering.
The HP filter is a nonparametric trend estimator which finds the trend line that minimizes
squared deviations away from the observed data, subject to a penalty against changes in
the squared second differences of the trend line. For our analysis, we chose a penalty value
of 50.
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published nationally, by select states, and by five Petroleum Administration
for Defense Districts or PADDs EIA [2013b]. Electricity sales and revenue data
were organized into regions consistent with those for which gasoline price data
were available EIA [2013c]. Nationally averaged retail price ratios (electricity
to gasoline) for the year 2011 are around 1.2, varying from 1.8 (State of New
York) to 0.8 (State of Washington). With the exception of Washington, all
other regional price ratios were greater than 1. We use 1.2 for our analysis.
Efficiency Correlation Elasticities. We identify end-use efficiency across
various residential electricity and passenger vehicle services based on Federal,
EnergyStar, and best-in-class standards. For electricity services, we include
air conditioning, lighting, refrigeration, water heating, clothes drying, clothes
washing, and dishwashing, which collectively constitute about 60% of residen-
tial electricity consumption and represent nearly all of the residential electricity
end uses historically subject to efficiency standards. The baseline efficiency for
retiring technologies was assumed equal to the Federal efficiency standard as-
sociated with their initial adoption. End-use efficiency changes for individual
services were estimated by assuming three technology swapping scenarios: cur-
rent or near-term minimum Federal efficiency standards (minimum expected
efficiency change), current or near-term EnergyStar standards (voluntarily se-
lected above-code efficiency change), or current best-in-class performance (vol-
untarily selected largest efficiency change). We allow for consumers to switch
technologies by end use (e.g., from CFL lamps to LED lamps) where renova-
tions beyond technology swapping are not required (e.g., from ducted space
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conditioning to ductless heat pump). These scenarios represent approximately
twenty years of historical efficiency changes over the major electricity end-uses
and conventional gasoline-powered vehicles. Table 3 summarizes the ranges of
efficiency changes defined by the above scenarios.
2.4 Results
Direct Rebound Estimates. To contrast our CES model and empirical
assumptions with other literature, we first consider the direct rebound effect
only as represented in Proposition 4. Figure 1 shows our direct, short-run
rebound estimates with heterogeneity in income, as previous empirical work
has identified income heterogeneity in rebound Milne and Boardman [2000],
Small and Van Dender [2007], Hirst et al. [1985]. Figure 1 shows that the CES
model indicates direct rebound for electricity services and personal transporta-
tion falls with income, as the share of these services is smaller for higher-income
households. This suggests that efficiency upgrades for lower-income households
are likely to lead to more rebound than a corresponding upgrade for higher-
income households. While not the explicit focus of this study, our estimates
of direct rebound compare favorably with literature-recommended empirical
estimates of rebound, which range from 10-30% Sorrell et al. [2009] and 0-50%
Greening et al. [2000]. This result suggests to us that our assumptions about
household utility preferences are plausibly not too restrictive. Moreover, our
model suggests that income heterogeneity and uncertainty and variability in
σ may explain differences in empirical estimates.
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Total Energy Elasticity. Next, we consider the net energy elasticity
accounting for direct and indirect rebound effects absent positively correlated
efficiency changes, which includes only the terms in Proposition 6. The solid
black line represent the technically feasible elasticity, while the dotted and
dark-grey areas represent the erosion of energy savings due to direct and in-
direct rebound, respectively. Thus, the light-grey area represents the total
energy response. Figure 3 plots total short-run rebound for both gasoline and
electricity showing the contributions from direct and indirect rebound. Im-
portantly, we see that direct rebound comprises an overwhelming contribution
of the total rebound if consistent efficiency changes are excluded. For median
earners (around $45k), the direct rebound for a change in transportation ef-
ficiency is near 18 percent (Figure 1). However, gasoline makes up just 70
percent of the total energy consumption. When both gasoline and electricity
are combined in Proposition 6, the net rebound effect with respect to total
energy use is 14 percent, which is lower than direct rebound estimates because
the response is relative to both energy sources, i.e., is weighted by shares.
Households with relatively large energy shares demonstrate the largest indi-
rect rebound response, which is characteristic of lower income households. This
makes economic sense, as income effects are only meaningful for goods that
nominally comprise a large share of expenditures. Our results suggest that
total rebound, the combination of direct and indirect effects on total energy
services, is around 5-13% for an electricity efficiency improvement, and 10-15%
for transportation efficiency improvement. Also note that total rebound across
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income is not strictly monotonic as is for direct rebound, as the relative shares
of energy inputs are not monotonic in income.
Efficiency Correlation. We now consider the implications of positively
correlated efficiency changes across energy services on net energy elasticities.
To more fully evaluate the effect of uncertainty and variation in substitution








, and efficiency correlation
(ηεi (εj)), we run a stochastic stimulation of Proposition 7.3, and report the
mean, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile of the results’ distribution. σ was as-
sumed to follow a uniform distribution along the minimum through maximum
literature estimates. Efficiency correlation was computed as the electricity
consumption-weighted average of efficiency choices, which were assumed to be
binomial between Federal minimum and best-in-class options for each service.
Share ranges were drawn from a bivariate normal distribution with means,
variances, and covariance estimated from consumer expenditure data. Fur-
ther simulation details are located in the appendix. It should be emphasized
that these simulation parameters are likely to be correlated by construction
(for example, the efficiency correlation elasticity and nominal energy shares).
However, we have no empirical data to characterize such correlation for these
end uses and treat them as independent.
Figures 4 shows short-run total energy elasticity under Models I-IV.
Because these models are sequentially nested, the differences in magnitude
between bars shown left to right represent the incremental contributions to
the net energy elasticity from each model. The top and bottom panels cor-
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respond to positively correlated efficiency changes initiated by electricity and
transportation services, respectively.
The broad features of the simulation show that positive efficiency cor-
relation brings about additional energy savings (Model III) which are only
partly offset by additional rebound Model (IV). In both cases, the technical
response from the secondary service alone (Model III) overcomes the energy
increases from conventional rebound (Model II), while the additional second-
order rebound (Model IV) has a relatively minor effect. With electricity as
the primary service, base-case estimates of rebound from efficiency correlation
(13%) are nearly double those of conventional rebound estimates (7%). With
transportation as the primary service, base-case estimates of rebound from
efficiency correlation (16%) are nearly the same as conventional first-order
rebound estimates (15%). These figures suggest that any empirical rebound
estimate which does not control for any simultaneous cross-service efficiency
changes is likely to overstate the rebound effect considerably. Finally, the wide
bands on estimates from Models III and IV speak to the inherent uncertainty
of the efficiency correlation elasticity, suggesting that the total response can
be much larger or just equal to the response without efficiency correlation.
While the lack of precision on these estimates is undesirable, the bottom and
top of the bands represent the absolute highest and lowest elasticity that could




Our energy elasticity (rebound) model of two-energy services with dis-
tinct but simultaneous efficiency change indicates that residential rebound
involves more complex consumer-technology interactions than described by
models that assume technical change for only one end use. Efficiency correla-
tion – or consistent efficiency change -across multiple end-uses increases techni-
cally feasible efficiency improvements but also drives additional, second-order
economic responses resulting from income and substitution effects across both
end uses. With respect to rebound, these second-order effects are the indirect
rebound from household energy services with distinct technical efficiencies.
We apply our model to estimate rebound across sectors by considering
rebound between residential electricity end-uses and gasoline use for personal
transportation. We estimate that the technical efficiency across these energy
services has recently been disproportionate (ηεi(εj) 6= 1), driven by differing
relative changes in Federal minimum code and above code standards. Base-
case results indicate that the magnitude of rebound from efficiency correlation
is similar to or greater than other conventional first-order rebound estimates,
even those that include indirect rebound without consistent efficiency change.
Figure 5 shows total energy elasticities given parametric variation in
σ and ηεi(εj) for the median income range ($40-$45k) and mean real and
nominal shares. Figure 5 indicates that efficiency correlation always increases
technically feasible savings over models that assume no consistent efficiency
change (ηεi(εj) = 0), which follows from the observation that neither energy
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service independently approaches backfire. Disproportionate efficiency change
(ηεi(εj) 6= 1) can significantly affect total energy elasticities, particularly for
small values of σ. If consumers cannot flexibly substitute across energy ser-
vices economically (lower σ), technical change for one service is not readily
“taken back” for a second service. Thus in the short-run (0.1 ≤ σ ≤ 0.2), en-
ergy elasticities (and thus rebound) are more sensitive to disproportionate effi-
ciency change. Short-run responses would be characteristic of energy services
for long-lived durable goods, where multiple efficiency changes are less likely to
occur in the short run (as our model assumes). In the long-run (0.7 ≤ σ ≤ 0.9),
however, consumers eventually do adjust expenditures to changes in prices, in-
come, and technical efficiency. Figure 5 indicates long-run energy elasticities
are much lower (less energy savings or higher rebound), with net energy elas-
ticities less than -0.2 for proportional efficiency change (ηεi(εj) = 1) and slight
deviations from -0.2 for disproportionate efficiency change. Since most em-
pirical studies estimate short-run rebound effects, or extrapolate long-run re-
bound estimates using autoregressive time-series models, rebound effects over
the long-run may be significantly higher than what is typically reported in the
literature.
Our energy elasticity (rebound) model of two-energy services with cor-
related efficiency change indicates that residential rebound involves consider-
ably more endogenous and exogenous consumer-technology interactions than
described by models that assume technical change for only one end use. Com-
plimentary empirical support indicates that these interactions, and in partic-
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ular correlated efficiency choices, are realistic and that they have a significant
effect on energy efficiency elasticities.
Potential for Backfire. Whether aggregate energy use increases or de-
clines depends critically on to what degree the economic responses, both di-
rect and indirect, may outweigh the technical reduction in energy use. Some
researchers have expressed concern about the relative uncertainty in the mag-
nitude of indirect rebound effects Saunders [2013], Binswanger [2001]. As an
extreme demonstration of potential indirect effects, consider the case of “back-
fire,” which will occur when total energy elasticity is positive. As illustrated in
the appendix, total energy elasticity with respect to energy i will be positive
if either energy input is sufficiently large. In the case where energy i is too
large, an increase in efficiency i can induce such a large income effect that
the increase in energy use j outpaces the absolute decrease in energy i (recall
from Propositions 4 and 5 that direct rebound is declining in Ei while indi-
rect rebound is increasing). On the other hand, for the case where Ej is too
large, both as a portion of the budget and a share of the energy mix, backfire
could occur because the indirect rebound response is magnified to the point
of eclipsing the direct energy elasticity. Consider the case where i = C and
j = T . A potential example would be a homeowner residing in an aggressively
energy efficient home but with a long commute, so that ET  EC . In such
a circumstance, an increase in home efficiency may result in a small absolute
decline in electricity use, while the cross-sector indirect effects may generate
large enough absolute increases in transportation services that total energy
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use may increase. On the other hand, for a homeowner that walks to work,
the cross-sector economic response would not offset the reduction in electric-
ity, resulting in net energy reductions. Despite these insights derived from our
model, empirical expenditure data indicate the magnitude of rebound is far
from backfire (see Figure 3 for example).
Efficiency correlation presents another channel for backfire. Even with
sufficiently small energy use levels, backfire may occur through a negative elas-
ticity between cross-sector efficiencies (ηεi(εj) < 0). Recall from Proposition 7
that total energy elasticity with efficiency correlation will be positive if:





So, if the cross-efficiency elasticity is sufficiently negative, total energy
use may increase as a result of a single-use efficiency increase. The logic is
straightforward: if an increase in efficiency i spurs a decrease in efficiency j,
then total energy use may increase on net. It should be noted that in our
simulations we do not observe such a case because, for all end-uses, even the
minimum-standard efficiency choice still represents an upgrade over the retir-
ing technology. However, we stress that such an outcome is specific to the
current environment, and speaks to the importance of minimum standards.
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With the exception of the fuel economy standards for passenger vehicles from
1990-2009, Federal code efficiency standards have consistently and routinely
increased. However, reasonable scenarios could invoke negatively correlated
efficiency changes. Some homeowners may compensate when making tech-
nology choices, e.g., justifying the purchasing a fuel inefficient vehicle after
upgrading to an efficient appliance. Homeowners could move to a less effi-
cient home. Mandated technical efficiency standards for one service could be-
come disproportionately more costly, constraining consumers for subsequent
efficiency choices. If these floors did not exist, then theoretically households
could potentially respond to an increase in one efficiency by reducing efficiency
in other energy sectors. While it seems unlikely that a household would choose
to make efficiency changes in opposite directions, it is more plausible to think
that households might respond to exogenously-induced changes (through in-
creases in minimum standards) by decreasing efficiency in other less-regulated
sectors. From a policy perspective, minimum code standards create a “floor”
for these potential efficiency downgrades, and, in turn, the potential for re-
bound from such efficiency combinations.
Qualitatively, our model suggests that exogenous (or federally man-
dated) efficiency minimums across multiple energy services must “keep up”
with each other to avoid this backfire scenario. As an example, suppose home-
efficiency standards increase for a household whose current transportation ef-
ficiency was well above the mandated minimum. If the gains from reducing
transportation efficiency (e.g. swapping out a high-priced, efficient sedan for
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a cheaper, dirtier SUV) was sufficiently high, or if nominal gasoline consump-
tion was sufficiently low (either through low gasoline prices or low-enough miles
drive), then the household would optimally decrease transportation efficiency
even as home efficiency increases (see end-section of Proofs for details). In
such a scenario, a negative efficiency elasticity would be observed, and total
energy use could potentially increase despite the fact that minimum efficiency
standards weakly improved across all services. This occurrence may partially
explain the spike in adoption of larger, less efficient cars observed from the
mid 1990’s to mid 2000’s, as fuel economy standards were stagnant for vehicles
while Federal standards disproportionately advanced efficiency for electricity
and natural gas end-uses. These arguments suggest that there are diminishing
returns to making more-efficient end-uses “better” if they are being jointly-
consumed with other energy-uses which lag far behind in efficiency.
Finally, we note the empirical limitations of our analysis, particular
concerning the imprecise calibration of efficiency-correlation elasticity. Con-
sumers making an above-code efficiency choice seem likely to make similar
choices across technologies, and Figure 1 suggests this type of consistent tech-
nical change occurs often. (It is likely that some, but few, technology instal-
lations profiled in Figure 1 were not chosen by householders but by builders
or designers.) One of the limitations of our empirical analysis is that we use
expenditure data that may or may not represent consistent adopters of effi-
cient technologies. Such adopters may also use energy technologies in a man-
ner consistent with reducing rebound; thus, expenditures representing typical
105
consumers may be misleading. Unable to control for such unobserved hetero-
geneity, we employ a simplified model of energy use assuming CES preferences,
which may be too restrictive to fully capture nuanced consumer responses to
efficiency improvements. However, empirical data characterizing both tech-
nology choices and observed energy consumption (or expenditures) is elusive,
and as such, we are limited in our modeling approach.
2.6 Conclusions
We develop a microeconomic model of household rebound for two dis-
tinct energy services with distinct but simultaneous efficiency changes. We
then apply the model to consider rebound between the residential and trans-
portation sectors. A range of empirical assumptions indicate that positively
correlated efficiency changes increase net energy elasticities (net energy sav-
ings) but that disproportionate efficiency changes across energy services can
significantly affect net energy elasticities. These effects are driven by second-
order indirect rebound responses induced by consistent efficiency changes across
two energy services. The magnitude of these second-order effects is consistent
with other known sources of rebound. While long-run rebound responses can
significantly erode net energy elasticities, we do not anticipate backfire from
positively correlated efficiency. However, negatively correlated efficiency could
induce backfire, and we discuss the implications of this finding. These results
imply that consistent efficiency improvements across end-uses could keep pace
with and thus temper economic responses.
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2.7 List of Tables
Table 1: Energy Elasticity Decomposition into Technical and Economic Responses. Note the “-1” term appears in the technical
elasticity column to connect the multiple-service model elasticity terms to the analogous elasticity in the single-service model, as the
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Table 2:  The elasticity of substitution (the change in electricity demands with respect to a change in transportation 
demands) is estimated using applying budget shares and price elasticities to proposition 2. 






Dahl Electricity  Median Short-run -0.17 0.023 0.15 
Dahl Electricity Lit. recommended Short-run -0.24 0.023 0.22 
Dahl Electricity Median Long-run -0.96 0.023 0.95 
Dahl Electricity Lit. recommended Long-run -0.8 0.023 0.80 
Brons Gasoline Median Short-run -0.16 0.043 0.13 
Dahl Gasoline Median Short-/intermediate -0.15 0.043 0.11 
Graham Gasoline Lit. recommended Short- run -0.18 0.043 0.14 
Brons Gasoline Median Long-run -0.69 0.043 0.68 












































Table 4: Incremental Contributions to Net Energy Elasticity with Positively Correlated Efficiency Changes
Model Description Incremental Terms
I First-order technical response −Ei
E






III Efficiency-correlation technical response −ηεi (εj) EjE
IV Second-order direct and indirect rebound ηεi (εj)
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Figure 2: Direct rebound estimates for a. electricity and b. transportation using a model of a single energy service 
with a CES production function. Ranges show one standard deviation in expenditures shares within the indicated 
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Figure 3: Short-run energy elasticities from a model including two energy services model for an efficiency 
improvement in either (a) electricity end-uses or (b) transportation.  The chart format is cumulative in the y-axis (a 
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Negative Equity and Landlock: Welfare
Impacts and Policy Implications
3.1 Introduction
Following a five-year decline in home prices during the Great Recession,
[CoreLogic, 2013b], the incidence of negative equity among homeowners grew
rapidly.1 At the end of 2012, 10.4 million homes, or 21.5%, of all residential
properties with a mortgage were in negative equity [CoreLogic, 2013a], down
from 24% in 2009.2 Previous work has analyzed how negative equity – through
households’ liquidity preferences, nominal loss aversion, or increased transition
costs – may decrease geographic mobility (commonly referred to as “landlock”)
and by extension employment opportunities. In short, negative equity makes
moving more difficult or costly, but not necessarily impossible. For example, a
1A property is in negative equity–also known as being “underwater” or “upside down”–if
the principal outstanding on its mortgage is higher than the value of the home itself. This
occurs when a home loses value, increases its mortgage debt, or a combination of both.
2The principal outstanding on a mortgage, particularly at the beginning of the loan,
amortizes very slowly, and thus a significant decline in home prices can quickly wipe away
any incremental gains in home equity. Furthermore, while the typical borrower in nega-
tive equity usually initiated their home investment with a high loan-to-value ratio (or low
initial equity), the magnitude of price declines in some markets like Florida, Nevada, Ari-
zona, and California were well above 40% cumulatively, enough to wipe-out equity even in
the conservative government-sponsored enterprises (GSE) mortgages which require a 20%
downpayment.
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homeowner in need of relocation might simply pay off the mortgage with cash
should the need arise; net worth would remain the same, and the homeowner
would be free to go. It would just be a matter of whether such an action were
optimal. What has not been documented in this literature, however, is a key
institutional observation: that underwater homeowners can only complete a
sale if they are able to provide cash to cover their negative equity position.
If non-housing assets cannot offset negative equity (in effect, if a homeowner
is underwater and insolvent), a sale cannot occur. In this case, it is not
that moving is suboptimal, it is in fact infeasible. This will have different
implications for household welfare and policy. So far, the policy response to
the housing crisis has been focused on foreclosure mitigation by way of loan
modifications (interest reductions, changes to amortization, etc.); even so, the
high incidence of negative equity remains. It is not clear that this policy is
optimal; for example, lower interest might make a mortgage more affordable,
but also incentivize the household to stay longer, thereby further decreasing
mobility. Mortgage policy has not yet been finalized in the context of limited
mobility brought upon by negative equity and landlock.
In this paper, I analyze the welfare cost of the landlock effect as repre-
sented by a hard constraint which reduces the spatial choice set for homeown-
ers. To do so, I introduce a job search model with savings where the agent is
restricted from spatially-distant job offers if she is landlocked. This model de-
parts from the literature in that it treats landlock as a reduction in the choice
set, rather than an additional cost to move. The model shows that expected
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durations (time until a job move occurs) increase as net assets fall, as house-
holds deep-enough in negative equity optimally choose not to search. This
results contrasts with that of a standard model, where households without a
landlock friction would show decreased durations as net assets fall. Further-
more, I find empirical evidence consistent with these results using data from
the Survey of Consumer Finances. Sample data from 2010 show that the rela-
tionship between net assets and expected durations is significantly different for
homeowners who are in negative equity. Importantly, durations fall as assets
fall for households who are above water – consistent with a standard model –
while durations either rise or stay flat for underwater households.
Additionally, I leverage the model to analyze the welfare impacts of
comparative mortgage-finance policies. I simulate the model under two policy
adjustments, i) reducing the cost of debt, and ii) lifting the landlock con-
straint, and consider the differential effects on labor supply, expected dura-
tions, and welfare. My results show that reducing the cost of debt, while
welfare-increasing, has no meaningful effect on labor supply or mobility. In
fact, homeowners who are currently landlocked remain so, even choosing to
save less than before. In my model, debt subsidies represent little more than a
wealth transfer between the household and the mortgage holder. Meanwhile,
removing the landlock restriction results in lower durations and higher welfare.
Households are better off being able to search and obtain better employment
opportunities when they are underwater, rather than receiving interest reduc-
tions. In fact, I estimate that median earners would be willing to pay between
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3-4 percentage points of additional interest on their debt to lift this restriction.
This result suggests that the landlock effect represents an incomplete lending
market. If feasible, homeowners would be willing to compensate lenders to
swap-out mortgage debt with other loans which do not constrain mobility.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 will background on nega-
tive equity, landlock, relocations, mortgage finance policy, and related litera-
ture. Section 3 will introduce the job search model and calibration. Section 4
will describe the SCF data, provide graphical evidence in support of landlock,
and present regression results. Section 5 will present welfare estimates from
competing policy scenarios. Section 6 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Relocation and Landlock
It has long been argued that negative equity affects homeowners’ ability
to move. Selling a home that is underwater requires providing additional liquid
assets to make up the difference between the home value and the remaining
mortgage principal. Previous work has focused on discovering whether this ad-
ditional cost hampers mobility, a debate which has not yet reached agreement.
However, what appears to be missing from this discourse is the nontrivial con-
cern that without sufficient assets to offset the negative equity accrued in the
home, the homeowner’s ability to sell becomes functionally obsolete. These
homeowners are referred to as “landlocked,” and are geographically immobile
not by choice (e.g. to avoid the additional costs of moving), but because they
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are legally and financially restricted from selling. Not typically addressed in
the literature, this is an important distinction, as it renders alternative spatial
and employment choices as infeasible, not just suboptimal.
A simple example might illuminate the distinction. Suppose there are
two homeowners, A and B, who both have a negative equity position of $10,000.
That is, both homes are worth $10,000 less than the corresponding principal
on their mortgages. Homeowner A has non-housing assets of $20,000, while
homeowner B has $0. Therefore, the former is financially solvent, while the
latter is not. Now, let’s say both homeowners were evaluating a decision to
move. To sell her home, homeowner A would have to pay the mortgage holder
$10,000. This is an additional cost to move, and depending on her preferences,
may or may not be a cost she is willing to pay. For example, she may have
a desire to keep $20,000 in liquid assets as opposed to $10,000, which is all
she would have left after the sale. This is how negative equity frictions are
typically incorporated in the literature. Agents have varying wealth positions
in their homes, and negative equity results in higher moving costs which can
reduce mobility and/or increase aggregate unemployment over geographical
regions. However, homeowner B, with the same negative equity position, is in
a completely different situation. Because he has no other assets, there is no
way he can pay the mortgage holder if he were to sell. Regardless of whether
he might choose to pay this cost or not, he is financially restricted from even
considering the option. This example illustrates that one’s negative equity
position alone does not create true landlock; rather, it is the combination
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of negative equity and net assets which determines whether a conceivable
move is feasible or not. For homeowner A, moving is feasible but costly. For
homeowner B, moving is impossible.
Recent estimates suggest that about 8-10% of households per year ex-
perience a permanent relocation[Ferreira et al., 2010, Molloy et al., 2011]. In
addition, since about 2001, just under 20% of new hires involved the employee
relocating for the position [Cha, 2010].3 As such, a nontrivial fraction of the
population faces a joint moving-employment problem each year, and this prob-
lem has become significantly more complex in the wake of large house price
declines which have eroded household wealth. According to Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, home equity represents a large share of their total wealth for
many homeowners, and a borrower in negative equity is also increasingly likely
to be balance-sheet insolvent.4 Relating back to the previous example, an av-
erage homeowner is more like to look like homeowner B than homeowner A.
Balance-sheet insolvency, unlike cash-flow insolvency, does not immediately
lead to default.5 This is because negative equity is not realized in a cash-
on-hand sense, only in the market value of the home and its corresponding
mortgage. Thus, a homeowner with negative equity is under no legal or finan-
cial sanction as long as they generate enough cash flow to make their monthly
3More recently, this figure has fallen significantly, mainly due to the prevalence of working
via remote-desktop-connection [Cha, 2010].
4As mortgage-financing conditions have become more accommodating over time, the
share of homeowners who use their home as their primary wealth-building vehicle has in-
creased .
5In fact, the majority of homeowners in negative equity continue to meet their mortgage
payments on time [CoreLogic, 2013c].
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mortgage payments.
Economic theory might suggest that it would be better for these home-
owners to “walk away” from the property, to strategically default on the mort-
gage and wipe away their negative equity position. There is some evidence to
support this: a recent study by oli [2010] concluded that about 20% of serious
delinquencies in 2008 were strategic, while Guiso et al. [2009] put this figure
close to 26%. However, there are several costs associated with default. These
include tangible costs like a damaged credit score as well as intangible costs
like shame and guilt caused by deviating from the perceived social norm of
honoring financial obligations [White, 2010]. Also, as long as the homeowner
has enough cash to make monthly payments, while also expecting the home
value to eventually exceed the mortgage principal at some future date, then it
would be perfectly rational not to default. For example, a Fed study found that
homeowners do not begin to strategically default until after the mortgage ex-
ceeds the home value by about 62%, a relatively high threshold where it would
seem very unlikely that the homeowner would regain positive equity within a
reasonable timeframe [Bhutta et al., 2010]. Also, a separate Boston Fed study
of a house-price decline in Massachusetts in the early 1990s found that less
than 10% of homeowners in negative equity eventually defaulted. Moreover,
there may be additional complications to the default decision based on the de-
cision to file bankruptcy as well [Foote et al., 2008]. While the incidence and
motivating factors behind strategic defaults is an important research topic, it
will not be the focus of this paper.
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Rather than defaulting, the primary downside of balance-sheet insol-
vency is the “landlock” effect, the inability to transact on the home in a
financially-material way.6 To reiterate, this is a hard constraint, not merely
an additional cost to the homeowner. Because the home is collateral for the
mortgage, the home cannot be sold without making the mortgagor “whole,”
or paying off the full principal of the mortgage.7 If a landlocked homeowner
cannot move, it follows that the homeowner would be unable to accept employ-
ment opportunities that lay outside her current residential area. Both firms
and workers are worse off by this inability to match. In particular, workers
who have the ability to earn higher wages in other locations are unable to do
so, and so their welfare is reduced by being restricted to choose their current
residential location. Furthermore, previous research suggests that labor mobil-
ity, rather than job creation and destruction, is the main adjust mechanism in
labor markets [Blanchard et al., 1992]. Such findings make it clear why land-
locked workers could decrease employment on a national scale; for example,
a recent IMF study suggests that the housing crisis has increased skills mis-
matches at the county level and contributed 13
4
% to structural unemployment
nationwide [Esteva˜o and Tsounta, 2011].
6This can include applying for auxiliary credit, making long-term investments with large
upfront costs, and mostly importantly, selling.
7A homeowner can complete a “short sale,” but this requires the agreement of the mort-




The policy response to the housing crisis has been swift and aggressive,
but almost exclusively focuses on mortgage payment reduction. An extensive
review is provided in the appendix, while a brief summary is provided here.
At the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, the main policy goal was to stabi-
lize the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market. For example, the Federal
Reserve was quick to accept MBS as collateral for loans from the discount
window and through the Term Auction Facility [Bernanke, 2009]. Later on,
the purchases of new MBS became a staple of each quantitative easing mea-
sure put forth. It was not until February of 2009 that the federal government
unveiled a policy specifically designed for current borrowers, the Homeowners
Affordability and Stability Plan. This policy consisted of two programs, the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), and the Home Affordable
Refinance Program (HARP). The HAMP was designed to encourage lenders,
through various guidelines and subsidies, to modify mortgages for an estimated
7 to 8 million struggling homeowners. These modifications included reducing
interest, extending amortization schedules, and in some cases writing-down
principle, all in the hopes of lowering the probability of borrower default and
increasing the present expected value of the mortgage . The HARP, on the
other hand, was a financing vehicle designed to help homeowners with high
loan-to-value ratios refinance on more favorable terms.8
8Both of these programs were administered by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
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While both measures helped to alleviate the threat of cash-flow insol-
vency, neither provided much assistance towards reducing balance-sheet insol-
vency. There are a few problems associated with this general approach. First,
as detailed by Mulligan, requiring that mortgage modifications be indexed to
income inadvertently transforms these measures into means-tested programs.
Thus, adhering to the qualifying prerequisites institutes an implicit income tax
of 31% for borrowers applying for modification [Mulligan, 2009, 2010]. Fur-
thermore, even with a strong policy push towards modification, a 2009 Boston
Fed study found that only 3% of all delinquent mortgages have been modified
[Adelino et al., 2013]. With the exception of the rare principal write-down
in the modification process, none of the policies mentioned above specifically
target negative equity homeowners. If negative equity restrains mobility and
hampers employment, then eliminating the landlock effect imposed by negative
equity could yield substantial benefits in the labor market by “unlocking” la-
borers who were previously geographically immobile. To my knowledge, there
has been little discussion in the literature on optimal mortgage-finance policies
to combat negative equity.9 If these effects are significant, policy may need to
9An exception would be Posner and Zingales [2009], who advocate for a policy which al-
lows underwater homeowners to force a renegotiation of the principal down to current value,
in exchange for a shared equity agreement on the future appreciate of the home between
the homeowner and lender. This plan specifically targets the negative equity problem, and
although the authors focus on the negative costs associated with foreclosure, would indi-
rectly remove the landlock constraint as well. What remains unclear, however, is whether
this plan would pay off for lenders. For example, my model predicts that durations are
dramatically reduced once the landlock friction is lifted. If the homeowner was quick to
sell upon the restructuring, it seems unlikely that the lender would break even through a
equity stake in the future appreciation of the home. Also, as previously mentioned, the
increasing complex ownership structure of mortgage debt makes the feasibility of such an
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be modified or expanded to address them.
3.2.3 Related Literature
This paper relates to several different portions of the extensive litera-
ture on relationships between home-ownership, equity, mobility, and employ-
ment. First, there is a broad literature which studies the effects of homeowner-
ship on employment, beginning with the Oswald hypothesis that homeowners
suffer longer unemployment durations (a non-exhaustive list includes Oswald
[1996], Coulson and Fisher [2009], Munch et al. [2006, 2008], Taskin and Ya-
man [2013]). Within that is a growing empirical literature on the the effect
of home-equity on mobility. Using individual-level mortgage data from a New
England commercial bank, Chan [2001] estimates a proportional hazard model
of residential durations, and finds that higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratios de-
crease mobility, with the partial effect amplifying as the LTV ratio increases.
Ferreira et al. [2010, 2011] use the American Housing Survey to find that the
occurrence of negative equity reduces the probability of moving by 30%, while
Schulhofer-Wohl [2011] finds no meaningful effect using the same data. Mean-
while, Donovan and Schnure [2011] look at county-level statistics from the
American Community Survey, and find that negative equity primarily reduces
within-county mobility, but either has no effect or sometimes even increases
out-of-county mobility. It remains the case that the literature has not agreed
agreement questionable. Still, the plan points in the right direction as combating negative
equity, rather than mortgage payments, as the main source of mortgage-finance troubles in
the current climate.
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upon the sign of the housing-mobility or negative-equity-mobility relationship.
There are competing hypotheses which could explain both results. On the one
hand, negative equity can create landlock, or simply add to the cost of moving
for a homeowner. On the other, negative equity could proxy for poor economic
conditions, in which owners and renters alike choose to migrate for better op-
portunities. I provide some empirical evidence from the Survey of Consumer
Finances which is consistent with the former argument, thought it should be
stated that the dataset and analysis is limited in its ability to differentiate
these two competing hypotheses.
This paper also relates to a macro-based literature which studies how
negative equity affect regional movements and unemployment. Esteva˜o and
Tsounta [2011] construct a skills-mismatch index for each state and find that
structural unemployment has been affected by both skills-mismatches and poor
housing conditions to the tune of 13
4
percentage points since the onset of the
Great Recession. On the other hand, Valletta [2013] shows that house-lock
has no meaningful effect on unemployment durations. Meanwhile, theoreti-
cal models with heterogenous geographic sectors and residential statuses have
consistently found that falling home prices can lead to reduced mobility and
aggregate unemployment. Some authors attribute this to the difficulty of af-
fording a new downpayment when prices decline [Karahan and Rhee, 2013,
Sterk, 2010], while others look to the liquidity impacts from selling [Head
and Lloyd-Ellis, 2012, Hollenbeck, 2010]. Nenov [2012] describes an economy
where debt overhang creates a default penalty which distorts migration deci-
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sions. These papers all seek to explain recent macroeconomic events by incor-
porating housing and negative equity frictions, but do not focus on the welfare
costs of those frictions, nor on the optimal policies to address them. Finally,
this paper builds off the joint-asset and search problem as detailed by Chetty
[2008]and Lentz and Tranaes [2005]. However, both consider these problems
in the context of unemployment insurance, while I focus on mortgage-finance
policy.
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, I con-
sider the landlock effect as a reduction in the spatial choice set, rather than
an increase in cost. This innovation more accurately describes the imposition
of negative equity when the homeowner has no offsetting assets to finance a
sale. As such, policy can be evaluated not just through varying net assets,
but through eliminating the landlock constraint directly. Second, I estimate
the welfare cost of this restriction in the context of a search-theoretic model
where agents are restricted from accepting spatially-distant job offers. Such an
estimate is useful for analyzing mortgage-finance policy, and has not been ex-
tensively addressed in the literature. Finally, I consider alternative mortgage-
finance policies and their effects on landlock, durations, and welfare. I show
that the current policy of loan modification and reducing the service cost of
debt has no materially effect on durations, and could be improved upon with
policies specifically geared towards reducing the incidence of landlock.
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3.3 Search Model
In this section, I introduce a general search model with saving/borrowing,
then introduces the landlock effect. Then, I describe and calibrate an explicit
model for simulation which follows closely to Chetty [2008]. Finally, I present
baseline model results.
3.3.1 Model
3.3.1.1 Standard Search Model
Consider a representative agent with current income stream w and cur-
rent net-assets A. One can think of A ≥ 0 representing balance-sheet solvency
and A < 0 representing balance-sheet insolvency. The vector (A,w) thus char-
acterizes the state of the agent. The agent lives in a home which she owns and
thus A represents the net-of-principal outstanding value of their home, plus
other non-housing, liquidable assets. Agents can earn a (1 + r) gross interest
rate on their assets, and discount future consumption streams by a rate of
β = 1/(1 + r). Furthermore, w can represent current wages if employed, or
some other benefit level if unemployed.
The agent is offered another employment opportunity each period, char-
acterized by its level of income w′. For simplicity, assume that once the agent
switches she keeps that job permanently. The offered wages are drawn from
a distribution that is conditional on search effort, F (w′|s). While keeping the
functional form of F (w′|s) general, the basic properties are that F (w′|0) = δ0,
meaning that no search effort yields a wage offer of zero with certainty, and
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that EF (w′|s)[w′] is increasing in s, implying that the marginal benefit of search-
ing is positive. The cost of searching is represented by an increasing, strictly
convex function, c(s), with c(0) = 0. Once the agent receives her offer, she
can decide to either keep her current income stream, or accept the new offer.
The timing of the agent’s problem is:
1. First, the agent chooses net-asset levels for tomorrow, A′.
2. The agent chooses s, and a wage offer is drawn based on conditional
distribution F (w′|s).
3. If applicable, the agent chooses to accept or reject the wage offer.
Let the agent’s utility be an increasing, strictly concave u(c). Then, the agent’s
problem can be represented as the following Bellman equations:
V (A,w) = max
A′≥−A








{u ((1 + r) · A− A′ + w′) + βJ(A′, w′)}} (3.2)
The additional constraint A′ ≥ −A is a lower-bound for savings, which
is common in infinite horizon models with borrowing. Without a lower bound,
it is plausible that an agent can choose to borrow without limit, servicing exist-
ing interest by accumulating additional debt, in a Ponzi-scheme type fashion.
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In my simulations, I consider A = 50, 000, which for reasonable interest rate
levels is never binding.
3.3.1.2 Search Model with Landlock
To incorporate the landlock friction, I construct the indicator variable
1(A′ ≥ 0), which equals 1 when the agent has (post-savings) enough assets to
sell and relocate, and equals 0 when she does not. This variable mechanically
renders the value of holding the better-paying job worthless when the agent is
in negative equity. The Bellman equations become:
V (A,w) = max
A′≥−A









{u ((1 + r) · A− A′ + w′) + βJ(A′, w′)}} (3.4)
While the indicator variable is a crude instrument for such an exposi-
tion, it captures the main feature that when a household is landlocked, jobs
which require relocation are out of reach, and thus removed as a choice vari-
able. This is a key distinction from the common hypothesis that negative
equity simply increases moving costs to the household.
To summarize, agents choose A∗, which by extension characterizes
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(1− s∗ (A∗t )) (3.5)
Expected duration captures not only the current probability of find a
job, but the dynamic impacts of future asset choices and their effects on future
probabilities as well.
There are some key limitations of this model. First, the model unnec-
essarily restricts offers within the agent’s location; in reality, workers search
for and receive wage offers that do not require moving. Thus, this model can
be thought of as representing laborers who do not receive better offers within
their location, or have already claimed the highest local wage offer possible.
Second, in real life homeowners amortize part of their mortgage each month
as they make their mortgage payments; this suggests that over time a home-
owner can resolve their negative equity without relying on home price gains
or additional savings. A more accurate model might include a law of motion
for housing wealth which would include this effect. I chose to omit this fea-
ture because resolving negative equity solely through loan amortization is a
lengthy process, particularly at the beginning of the mortgage, and thus on
a per-period basis would not make much of a difference. Third, the assump-
tion that the household keeps the better-wage offer indefinitely restricts the
household from future on-the-job search, which admittedly abstracts a fair bit
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from reality, and does not adequately characterize separations or transitions.
However, this is the same assumption as in Chetty [2008] as well as Lentz and
Tranaes [2005], both of which focus on the joint savings and search decision. If
future on-the-job search added more value to a current wage opportunity, then
this would more so affect the wage-search relationship rather than the asset-
search relationship and the analysis of alternative mortgage-finance policies,
which is of focus here. Finally, by modeling housing and non-housing assets
jointly, I incorrectly restrict an agent with positive home equity but negative
assets elsewhere. In reality, a household’s non-housing debt does not preclude
them from relocating, so long as they have positive home equity. However,
the fact that one’s residence is the primary asset accumulation vehicle for
most homeowners implies that this occurrence is unlikely. In addition, since
mortgage financing in the U.S. is subsidized relative to other forms of debt, a
homeowner in such a situation would optimally choose to borrow against the
home to pay off that debt. In sum, the model omits some key features of the
housing, mortgage, labor, and lending markets, but these omissions are not
instrumental to the key results I want to derive, and ultimately would create
more complexity than improvement.
3.3.2 Explicit Model for Simulation and Calibration
For simulation, I follow a similar framework as proposed by Chetty
[2008]. Consider an agent who can only obtain a single wage offer equal to
w′ = (1 + ρ)w, where ρ > 0, and will take the offer if received. Intuitively, the
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value of ρ represents the standard raise an agent receives when she finds better
employment. Since the distribution of wage offers is a singleton, there is no
reservation-wage choice. Moreover, consider search effort s to be normalized to
equal the probability of finding that job in the current period. With probability
s, the agent receives wage offer w′ = (1 + ρ)w, and with probability (1 − s),
she receives no wage offer, or w = 0. Hence, we see that in the standard search
model:
EF (w′|s] [max (V (A′, w), J(A′, w′))] = (1−s)V (A′, w)+s·J(A′, (1+ρ)w), (3.6)
which is consistent with the properties of the wage distribution in the
general model described in Section 3.1. Similarly, for the model with the
negative equity friction:
EF (w′|s] [max (V (A′, w), J(A′, w′))] = (1−s)V (A′, w)+s·1(A′ ≥ 0)·J(A′, (1+ρ)w).
(3.7)
With frictions, the agent can begin receiving the new income stream if and
only if her net asset level A′ ≥ 0. The agent’s problem can be written as:
V (A,w) = maxA′≥−A{u ((1 + r) · A− A′ + w) +
max
s∈[0,1]
{β [(1− s)V (A′, w) + s · 1(A′ ≥ 0) · J(A′, (1 + ρ)w)]− c(s)}} (3.8)
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J(A,w) = maxA′ {u ((1 + r) · A− A′ + w) + βJ(A′, w)}} (3.9)
The model above is identical to the Chetty model with some distinc-
tions. First, I consider an annual time period instead of weekly. Hence, I
include a nonzero discount rate. Secondly, I include the term friction variable
1(A′ ≥ 0) which renders the value of holding the better-paying job worthless
when the agent is in negative equity.
In line with Chetty’s model, I consider the constant relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA) utility function: u(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ . Note that u(c) > 0, ∀c > 0,
implying that V (A,w) > 0 and J(A,w) > 0 for all relevant values of A and
w. Next, I consider the search-cost function c(s) = θ s
1+κ
1+κ
. With θ, κ > 0, this
function satisfies the properties of the general cost function in Section 3.1.
3.3.2.1 Parameter Assumptions and Calibration
Aside from A, which is predetermined at $50,000, the model has five
parameters Θ = (γ, θ, κ, r, ρ). To calibrate the model, I rely on the data
from the Survey of Consumer Finances. The survey asks households how
long they expect to remain in their current employment state, whether fully-
, partially-, or unemployed. Next, I choose five asset levels (in thousands)
L = {−50,−25, 0, 25, 50}} and compute local conditional averages for wages,
w (i) and expected durations, D (i). Finally, I use an indirect inference tech-
nique that minimizes the squared deviations between the model-generated and
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E [D (i, w (i) ,Θ)]−D (i))2} (3.10)
In essence, this procedure calibrates the model by matching the shape
of the model’s duration-assets curve to the sample data for asset levels from -50
to 50 thousand. The results are tabulated in Table 1. The coefficient of relative
risk aversion is well within ranges estimated by Chetty [2006]. Meanwhile, the
estimated nominal interest rate of 5.4% is right in line with typical discount
rates, and the estimated wage premium near 19% is within range of industry
estimates . In both comparisons to the data and to estimates from previous
work, the parameter values appear reasonable.
3.3.3 Baseline Model
Figures 1-3 plot optimal search effort, savings, and expected duration,
with net assets on the horizontal axis, and four relevant income levels high-
lighted. These are the average annual level of unemployment benefits in the
U.S. ($15,000), as well as the first three quartiles of the U.S. income distribu-
tion ($25,000, $45,000, $90,000) . To numerically solve the model, I discretize
the net asset space into $1000 increments.10
10To ensure that the nonnegativity constraint c ≥ 0 never binds, I restrict w ≥ 5000 and
A = 50000.
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The model makes clear that agents in deep enough negative equity
chooses to eliminate search effort, although this threshold varies with income.
Search effort increases abruptly at an asset-level (conditional on income) where
the agent aggressively saves, and chooses assets equal to zero. Then, search
effort gradually reduces as assets increase above zero, as the marginal utility
of income declines. Interestingly, this latter result was the key insight from
Chetty’s work on optimal unemployment insurance that search effort is de-
clining in net assets, and thus, benefits are more valuable for agents with low
assets. However, in a model with negative equity frictions, this monotonic re-
lationship no longer survives. An agent with low-enough assets will eliminate
searching if there is no financially viable way to sell an underwater home in
order to relocate.
We can see in Figure 2 that agents of all incomes choose to save, often
aggressively so, to reduce their negative debt positions, and eventually lift the
landlock constraint. In fact, for small enough debt positions, agents save in
lump-sum to clear the landlock threshold. As the agents’ net asset position
approaches zero from below, the agent reaches an implicit “reservation” net
asset level for each income level, Aˆ(w). For initial assets A < Aˆ(w), A′∗ < 0,
and s∗(A′∗) = 0. However, for A ≥ Aˆ(w), the agent optimally chooses A′∗ = 0
to remove the negative equity friction, and thus s∗(A′∗) > 0. This property
is consistent with Adelino et al. [2013] that many homeowners self-cure their
financial woes. It is also consistent with the recent pattern of aggregate mort-
gage credit among U.S. households. From the household obligations data from
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FRB, in the 5 years before the Great Recession, mortgage credit increased on
average 1.0% per quarter; in the five years after, mortgage credit decreased
1.2% per quarter . Combined with anecdotal evidence, it suggests that home-
owners are aggressively reducing their debt positions. As the model shows, this
behavior is engendered because agents in negative equity cannot seek better
wage offers, and despite the current-period utility loss of decreased consump-
tion, agents find it optimal to aggressively save to attain better wages in the
future.
Figure 3 plots expected duration for each income level. Durations are
increased for very high and very low assets, but for very different reasons. The
former occurs because agents choose to search less because of the diminishing
return of additional income. Agents with low-enough assets choose not to
search because they are landlocked and cannot accept a new position even if
offered.
3.4 Empirical Motivation from the Survey of Consumer
Finances
To motivate the search-theoretic model with landlock constraints, the
following section provides some further empirical evidence of landlock effects,
in addition to the related literature above. Specifically, I utilize the Survey of
Consumer Finances to test whether the incidence of landlock, separate from
just negative equity or net-worth positions, increases expected employment
durations. The Survey of Consumer Finances provides detail on households’
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expected duration in their current residences and occupational statuses, as well
detailed financial information on net assets and home equity. Combined, they
provide a glimpse of how durations might change between land-locked and
freely-mobile households. Section 4.1 offers a data description and graphical
evidence, while Section 4.2 presents the regression model and output. Section
4.3 concludes.
3.4.1 Data Description and Graphical Evidence
The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is a questionnaire conducted
by the Federal Reserve Board every three years on the demographic, financial,
and occupational characteristics of U.S. households. The main goals of the sur-
vey are to capture aggregate patterns in household saving, investment, wealth
accumulation, income prospects, and expectations. I use the SCF from 2010
since, because of its concurrence with the decline in home prices, contains
the sharpest variation in the incidence of negative equity. The 2010 survey
includes responses from 6,482 families, totaling about 5300 variables. The pri-
mary attraction of the SCF data is the in-depth detail of asset holdings and
net worth. An ideal dataset to test the landlock constraint would be one which
contained home equity levels, net asset levels, and search-related characteris-
tics like effort and durations. While to my knowledge this ideal dataset does
not exist, there were several alternatives which captured some features which
were needed for this exercise. For example, the Health and Retirement Survey
(HRS) collects asset and debt holdings data along with expectations of future
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employment. However, the data on home equity itself is quite sparse and im-
precisely surveyed. Additionally, the sample of soon-to-be retirees is not likely
to be representative of the full population. Also, Krueger and Mueller [2010]
leveraged data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) to identify search
effort patterns among unemployed laborers. However, it does not appear that
the ATUS publishes information on survey respondents’ asset portfolio, mak-
ing identification of negative equity effects infeasible. Finally, the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is rich in the details of employment
prospects, durations, and moves, but unfortunately it lacks the necessary de-
tails in real estate holdings to impute home equity.11 Therefore, the SCF’s
combination of rich (and complete) net worth details along with viable proxies
for job-search activity and expectations made it the best data option among
the alternatives.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the SCF data, split between
positive and negative equity households. First, the SCF relatively under-
samples negative equity households (5% in the SCF compared to about 25%
according to CoreLogic). There are an additional 8% of households who are
insolvent but not underwater. Also, homeowners in negative equity are on
average younger, more likely to be in the labor force, have more kids, have
slightly more income, have less wealth, and about 4 times more likely to be
financially insolvent. Note that the survey is over-sampled in high-income,
11The SIPP asks respondents if they hold a mortgage, but do not collect data on home
and mortgage values.
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high-wealth households which pushes up average statistics relative to the U.S.
population; for the remainder of the analysis, I will restrict the sample to those
individuals whose absolute value of net worth is below $1,000,000.
While the SCF does not collect data on specific job search activity, it
asks other questions which are plausibly affected by the respondent’s job search
effort, mobility, and their expectations of future employment developments. In
particular:
• Section R, Work and Pensions: (If full-time employed) How many years
do you expect to continue working for this employer? (If part-time em-
ployed) In how many years do you expect to start working full-time? (If
unemployed) In how many years do you expect to start working?
Regardless of current income situation, the SCF asks respondent when in the
future they expect a change in employment status. For employed workers, this
would reflect their estimate of when they expect to change employers, and for
under- or unemployed workers, this would reflect when they expect to find
full-time employment. To the extent that any spatially-distant job offers are
unattainable, landlocked homeowners would have higher expected duration of
current employment (or unemployment) than other respondents. This will be
the dependent variable in the following graphical and regression analyses. The
duration data is collected for the head of household, or spouse, or both. I take
the maximum duration from both responses. Using average durations does
not materially change the broad features of the analyses.
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First, I provide some graphical evidence with a scatter-plot of the survey
question detailed above, observed in Figure 4. The plot shows the average
response to each question, averaged over $1000 net-asset-level buckets. I plot
asset-levels between $-100,000 to $100,000 to better observe behavior close to
0, although the broad shapes of the plots looks similar if I expand the window.
For households with positive net assets, there is a positive relationship
between assets and duration, a result consistent with the notion that search
effort decreases with assets as detailed in Chetty [2008]. For households with
negative net assets, there is a slight negative relationship, with the largest
expected durations for households who are severely insolvent. Note that survey
responses appear to exhibit greater variance for households with negative net
assets. Finally, the blue line is a local polynomial fit, and shows a similar
“U”-shaped pattern also seen in expected durations generated from the model.
That should not be a surprise, since the model was calibrated off this shape;
however, it reinforces the intuition behind the model that durations ought to
increase as assets move away from zero, but for entirely different reasons.
The graphical evidence is consistent with that negative equity and the
landlock effect restrains mobility and increase expected durations. Households
with negative assets on average expect to remain in their current occupational
state for a longer period of time than households with positive assets. While
this graphical evidence is insightful, it is not precisely the relationship I want to
observe. The particular sub-population that ought to face mobility restrictions
are those households who are both balance-sheet insolvent and in negative
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equity. While the plots above show variation in net assets only, I need to
interact the two in order to truly test the model. The regression analysis
which follows will investigate this matter in further detail.
3.4.2 Regression Analysis
Along with the graphical evidence, I run regressions of the duration
responses on net assets, both stand alone and interacted with the incidence of
negative equity. I allow the assets-duration relationship to be flexible to in-
creased polynomials, and to differ above and below zero. Households who are
in negative equity and have negative net assets are considered “landlocked”
because they lack the assets to cover their negative equity position. These
households should exhibit a different relationship between assets and dura-
tions, particularly for negative net asset positions. Therefore, the statistical
test of interest is a Chow test for a structural break in the asset-duration re-
lationship between above-water and underwater households. In the following
section, I run OLS regressions of the form:
Di = α + δ1Ai + δ2A
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+X ′iβ + εi (3.11)
yi represents the survey response on duration, Xi is the vector of con-
trols, Ai is net assets, and Hi is home equity, For controls, I consider two
broad variable sets. First, I consider demographic controls such as age, edu-
cation, gender, marriage, kids, and labor force participation. Next, I consider
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income & saving controls such as income, and the ownership of checking and
saving accounts, stock holdings, and non-financial asset holdings.12 I include
these latter controls in the case that the incidence of landlock is correlated
with households with low productivity or less financial literacy. Lastly, as
mentioned before due to the relative over-sampling of high-income, high-net
worth households in the SCF, I also consider further limiting the sample to
household with assets less than $1,000,000 in absolute value.
Table 3 presents regression results where I regress expected employ-
ment status duration as described in equation (11). Moving from left to right,
I begin with no controls, and just the net assets variables alone. Then, I in-
clude the two control sets, first in isolation then in combination. Across all
regressions, the coefficient on the underwater indicator remains highly signifi-
cant, with a point-estimate of 2.658 in the final regression. Also, the interac-
tions of the underwater indicator and net assets remain broadly significant as
well. Importantly, the interaction between squared net assets and the under-
water indicator remains highly significant and negative, suggesting durations
are marginally increasing as net assets turn negative for underwater house-
holds. Estimated standard error remains stable across all regressions, and the
Chow test for a structural break between above- and under-water households is
highly significant in all specifications. The regression suggests that landlocked
households have increased durations (decreased search effort) as compared to




It should be noted that there are likely to be unobservables which are
correlated with both expected durations and housing conditions; making the
correlations between negative equity and durations somewhat murky. For ex-
ample, the incidence of landlock could be correlated with depressed economic
conditions, which in turn are correlated with poor job opportunities. Or, it
could be that landlocked households are also poorer earners, and see no reason
to search for new jobs. If so, then estimates of the effect of landlock on dura-
tions are likely to be biased upward. Alternatively, poor local economic condi-
tions might lead households (particularly ones with better long-run prospects)
to default and move, in which case, the relationship between landlock and du-
rations would be biased downward. Since the SCF does not include geographic
information (publicly) which in turn could proxy for local economic conditions,
nor does it attempt to assess households’ productivity, I cannot capture these
effects in the data.
However, it should be noted that, at least from the observables which
relate to financial literacy and labor productivity, there does not appear to
be a stark contrast between households which are above- and underwater.
Negative equity households have about the same level of education, and are
more likely to be in the labor force. Also, they are about as likely to have
checking accounts, savings account, equity and non-financial holdings. While
not definitive evidence, these features suggest that there are no relevant ob-
servable characteristics which are significantly correlated with home equity.
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Secondly, to the extent that the income and saving controls proxy for inherent
productivity or financial wherewithal, the landlock effect appears significant
even in conjunction with these variables. The regressions as specified suggest
that negative assets alone do not discourage homeowners from moving; rather,
only negative assets combined with negative equity have this effect. While not
comprehensive, these results are consistent with several of the main features
of the search model presented in Section 3, and give support toward its use
for policy analysis.
3.4.3 Empirical Conclusions
The Survey of Consumer Finances provides comprehensive asset and
debt characteristics for U.S. households, along with viable proxies for job-
search behavior. Graphical evidence suggests that households with negative
net assets have longer expected durations for their current occupational state
than do households with positive net assets. The visual evidence is supported
in the data; OLS regressions of expected duration find that underwater house-
holds have a significantly different assets-duration relationship that above-
water households, and the corresponding assets-durations are consistent with
the search-theoretic model. These findings are robust across a variety of speci-
fications including demographic and financial controls. While not comprehen-
sive, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that landlocked home-
owners are less mobile and experience longer employment durations due to
the inability to relocate for new jobs. The next section will calculate welfare
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effects from competing policies to estimate the severity of this friction and
plausible remedies.
3.5 Welfare Effects and Policy
In this section, I compute the effects of two competing mortgage-finance
policies. First, I consider the effect of removing the landlock constraint has
on expected durations and welfare. Then, I simulate an interest-reduction
scenario consistent with current mortgage modification policy. I finish with
discussion and conclusions.
3.5.1 Landlock Removal Simulation
Let V (A,w) be the value function of the landlock model for an agent
with assets A and income w, and let V˜ (A,w) be the value function of the
standard search model, with no constraint. To calculate the welfare costs of
the landlock effect, for each asset level A, I find the income level w such that
V (A,w) = V˜ (A,w). The welfare impact is then calculated as w −w, for each
A. Alternatively, one can calculate the welfare difference by evaluate the value
function difference V˜ (A,w) − V (A,w), and then calculating its consumption
equivalent in the baseline model. These approaches are similar, the only dif-
ference being that wages will differ from consumption only through savings.
Since savings is an integral part of the model, particularly for initial assets
near the landlock threshold, the former measure is preferred in this analysis,
as it capture the full, dynamic effect of wages on future savings as well.
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The wage-equivalent welfare measure can be described as the amount of
income an agent would give up in order to “live” in the standard search model,
where negative equity frictions do not matter. The ratio w−w
w
represents the
fraction of income she would sacrifice, and the ratio w
A
represents the additional
interest rate an agent would be willing to pay on her negative equity position.
Expected durations are calculated using the optimal search function consistent
with the no-landlock value function.
Figures 5a-d show the results of this simulation. First, Figure 5a il-
lustrates how labor supply (in the form of search effort) is “unlocked’ with
the removal of the landlock constraint. Households optimally choose to search
at all asset levels, not just nonnegative levels. The search-asset profile now
looks similar to those discovered by Chetty [2008]. As a result, durations are
markedly reduced for households in negative equity (Figure 5b). Welfare gains
as a fraction of income are plotted in Figure 5c. At the extreme, agents who
earn the average unemployment benefit would give up 9.5% of their income to
remove the friction from having a $50,000 underwater position. This fraction
declines as net assets increase; intuitively, agents with deeper negative equity
positions have “further to go” in climbing out of debt, hence, their welfare
loss is greater. Note also that the welfare loss declines with income as well;
for median earners, the welfare gain is roughly 2% of income, and at the third
quartile of the income distribution, the welfare gain is close to zero.
Figure 5d shows the “break-even” interest rate an agent would pay to
remove the landlock friction. As mentioned earlier, this is simply the ratio of
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the welfare loss to net assets. The relevant thought experiment is to imagine
that the agent could obtain a loan that would swap out her negative equity
position with some other unsecured debt. If so, the agent’s net asset position
would remain the same, but the agent would no longer be landlocked and
would not be precluded from job search. The “break-even” interest rate cap-
tures the additional interest the agent would be willing to pay for this loan.
Since this rate is relative to a baseline where the agent is already paying for
mortgage debt, the break-even rate represents the additional interest on top of
the current mortgage rate. As the figure shows, an agent with median income
would pay about 3-4 percentage points in additional interest for this type of
loan. The break-even rates increase with net assets because the welfare gains
do not diminish as quickly as the absolute value of net assets. While 300-400
basis points is a large sum, comparatively it pales in comparison to the interest
rate on most unsecured consumer loans.13
3.5.2 Interest Reduction Simulation
Next, I will run another simulation where, instead of lifting the landlock
constraint, I simply eliminate the mortgage risk premium from the interest
rate, which averaged about 180 basis points from 2005-2010. Specifically, I set
the interest rate from 5.6% to 3.8%, and compute the difference in welfare,
durations, and savings. If the baseline model is written as V (A,w, 0.056), then
13As a reference, the average interest rate on 24-month personal loans in February 2013
was 10.12% according to the Federal Reserve.
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the policy simulation will find the w such that V (A,w, 0.056) = V (A,w, 0.038).
Figures 6a-e show the results of this simulation. As is clear to see,
optimal search effort is hardly changed in this scenario. Lowering the cost of
debt provides incrementally more consumption for the agent, but does nothing
towards eliminating the state of landlock. However, Figure 6b illustrates that
because the price of debt has been reduced, agents optimally choose to save
less than they did in the baseline. Therefore, agents in negative equity do
not climb out of landlock any faster than before. Thus, durations do not
materially change as well. Importantly, the interest reduction policy does not
provide higher welfare gains – both as a fraction of income and net assets –
than landlock removal policy for almost all negative asset positions and income
levels.
This model illustrates how lowering the service cost of debt increases
welfare, but only through the first-order effect of providing additional con-
sumption to the homeowner. However, this policy also reduces net saving,
and has no meaningful impact on search effort or durations. If policymak-
ers about these secondary effects, a policy concerned with interest reduction
would seem suboptimal. Furthermore, the model reveals that a policy which
targeted underwater mortgages and “unlocking” those borrowers would miti-
gate these undesired effects by increasing welfare while promoting search effort
and lowering expected durations.
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3.5.3 Government Loan Facility
The simulations above demonstrate that a policy which directly tar-
geted landlock could outperform the current policy of mortgage modification.
This is because households are better off being able to search and obtain better
employment opportunities when they are underwater, rather than receiving in-
terest reductions. The landlock effect represents an incomplete lending market.
If feasible, homeowners would be willing to compensate lenders to swap-out
mortgage debt with other loans which do not constrain mobility. In particu-
lar, one might consider adopting a policy whereby borrowers could apply for
a loan equal to the level of negative equity in their home, giving the borrower
enough cash to sell the home if they so choose. The borrower retains the same
net-asset level as before, but with a different combination of debt that does not
impose a landlock constraint. Unlike modifications, this policy would directly
target landlock, and unlike principal write-downs, it would allow borrowers to
free themselves of their landlock burdens while not imperiling the value of that
mortgage to the investors who own it.
As Feldstein [2005] has argued, loan provisions have the desirable prop-
erty of reducing the distortionary incentives which affect most government
assistance programs. In applying for a loan, homeowners do not have an in-
centive to worsen or misreport their true state of financial hardship. Because of
the costs associated with repaying that loan, an applicant would be interested
in obtaining credit only if there were some better alternatives to be attained
by relieving themselves of their landlock constraint; in particular, receiving
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better wages in another geographical location. Thus, such a loan provision
would naturally provide support to those households whose welfare is reduced
the most by being landlocked. Additionally, in Chetty [2008], a loan program
outperforms the current U.S. policy (replacement benefits for a fixed dura-
tion) by better aligning unemployed workers’ incentive towards seeking new
employment.
Relative to those who decline, the households who would choose to ob-
tain such a loan would have, : a) lower income, making the policy progressive in
its implementation, b) a smaller underwater position, thereby mitigating moral
hazard incentives to make one’s mortgage “worse” in order to receive aid, and
c) better-paying potential wage offers, implying the loans would be supplied
to those households whose opportunity cost of being landlocked are highest.
Thus, we can see that many of the selection and asymmetric information issues
which plague current mortgage-finance policy would be substantially reduced.
Furthermore, because this loan facility would swap out new debt for old, the
original mortgagors would not be obligated to engage in an equity-sharing ar-
rangement as in Posner and Zingales [2009]. Instead, the original mortgagor
would be made whole in the same manner that would occur under typical
sales.
While there remain questions on the riskiness of these borrowers and
the appropriate risk premia to charge14, the results above illustrate that if
14As mentioned earlier, the current premium on personal loans (relative to mortgage rates)
is around 6%, above most break-even rates estimated in the model.
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this type of loan facility were feasible and budget-neutral, it would provide
substantial benefits over the current policy regime.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
The recent housing crisis has left over one-fifth of all mortgagees “un-
derwater,” and in many cases balance-sheet insolvent (and thus, “landlocked”).
I provide evidence which supports the notion that the incidence of landlock,
as opposed to just negative equity or large borrowing positions, increases em-
ployment durations by removing the incentive for households to look for work
outside of their current geographical region. Despite these disruptions, most
of the recent policies put forth in response to the housing crisis have largely
overlooked negative equity, and as a result there has only been mild progress in
this regard over the last few years. This paper analyzes the effect of mortgage-
finance policies when the landlock effect is a hard constraint on a homeowner’s
spatial choice set. In such an environment, search effort is eliminated when
agents are in deep-enough negative equity. Empirical observations from the
Survey of Consumer Finances are consistent with this result; durations increase
as net assets fall below zero only for household in negative equity. Welfare es-
timates indicate that a median income earner would sacrifice about 2% of her
income, or pay between 3-4% additional interest on her negative equity posi-
tion to be relieved of this burden, all the while reducing durations by inducing
agents to search again. This compares favorably to the current policy of loan
modification and interest reduction, which has smaller welfare gains, insignif-
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icant impact on durations, and inducing agents to save less. Households are
better off being able to search and obtain better employment opportunities
when they are underwater, rather than receiving interest reductions. This re-
sult suggests that the landlock effect represents an incomplete lending market.
If feasible, homeowners would be willing to compensate lenders to swap-out
mortgage debt with other loans which do not constrain mobility.
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3.7 List of Tables
Table 3.1: Model Parameter Estimation
Duration (Years)
Net Assets Income Data Model Parameter Estimated Value
$-50,000 $58,312 9.747 12.479 γ 1.3088
$-25,000 $46,947 9.220 9.690 θ 0.1588
$0 $32,946 7.398 7.561 κ 0.3847
$25,000 $47,427 10.895 8.883 r 0.0560
$50,000 $60,648 11.372 10.095 ρ 1.1880
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Table 3.2: Survey of Consumer Finances 2010 Summary Statistics




# Years Education 13.2 13.9
(2.7) (2.2)
% in Labor Force 0.76 0.89
(0.43) (0.31)
% Male Head of Household 0.82 0.89
(0.45) (0.40)
% Married 0.66 0.70
(0.50) (0.46)




% with Checking Acct. 0.85 0.94
(0.36) (0.24)
% with Savings Acct. 0.50 0.54
(0.50) (0.50)
% with Stock Holdings 0.11 0.12
(0.31) (0.32)
% with Nonfinancial Holdings .89 1.00
(0.31) (0.00)
Home Equity 62,050 -47,317
(101,028) (99,874)
% Solvent 0.89 0.56
(0.31) (0.50)
% Landlocked 0.00 0.44
(0.00) (0.50)
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Table 3.3: Regession Model: Expected Employment Status Duration
Sample: |Net Assets|<$1m
Net Assets (mil.) 1.205*** 1.611*** 0.036 0.920***
(0.185) (0.190) (0.207) (0.203)
Squared Net Assets -0.147*** -0.183*** -0.059** -0.125***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022)
Net Assets X Insolvent 1.343 1.379 3.914* 2.661
(2.079) (2.130) (2.047) (2.101)
Squared Net Assets X Insolvent 1.212 1.415 1.556 1.619
(1.005) (1.046) (0.990) (1.026)
Interaction: Underwater
Underwater 4.336*** 3.565*** 2.754*** 2.658***
(0.976) (0.946) (0.967) (0.928)
Net Assets (mil.) -2.082* -2.040** -2.006* -1.966*
(1.076) (1.023) (1.064) (1.007)
Squared Net Assets 0.323** 0.306** 0.335** 0.312**
(0.150) (0.130) (0.143) (0.134)
Net Assets X Insolvent 1.415 -0.538 0.652 -0.830
(3.527) (3.420) (3.445) (3.354)
Squared Net Assets X Insolvent -1.655 -2.263* -1.885* -2.376**
(1.203) (1.214) (1.182) (1.190)
Demographic Controls X X
Income & Saving Controls X X
Chow Test Statistic 6.45*** 5.85*** 3.77*** 4.86***
Observations 3386 3386 3386 3386
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Figure 1: Optimal search effort from the baseline model with the
landlock constraint. Search effort falls to zero (no probability of
receiving an offer) if households are in deep enough negative eq-
uity. For small enough negative positions, households choose to
save enough to reach a nonnegative asset level, thereby “unlock-
ing” search effort. This critical threshold varies by income; higher-
income households can save more aggressively to reach positive
equity more quickly.
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Figure 2: Households save aggressively to reduce negative posi-
tions in light of the landlock constraint. At some income-specific
threshold, households “jump” immediately to $0 assets, “unlock-
ing” search effort.
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Figure 3: Expected durations as a function of net assets form a
“U” shape. Durations increase as assets move up from zero, as the
marginal utility of higher income falls. But, durations also rise as
assets move down from zero, as households become landlocked and
optimally choose not to search.
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Survey of Consumer Finances: Expected Duration of Current Employment Status
Data ($1,000 Buckets)
Local Polynomial Fit
Figure 4: Expected employment durations, averaged in $1000
net worth buckets. The plot shows a “U” shape, consistent with
expected durations from the baseline model.
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Optimal Search Effort: Median Income
With Landlock Friction
Without Landlock Friction









Change in Expected Duration: Median Income
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Figures 5a-5d: Model simulation where the landlock constraint is
removed for the household. Search effort is “unlocked” for negative
equity positions, since households are free to search regardless of
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net worth status. As a result, expected durations fall markedly.
The welfare gains from this removal average aroun 2% of income for
median income earners, and represent about 300-400 basis points
of additional interest.
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Optimal Search Effort: Median Income
Baseline
Interest Reduction
































Change in Expected Duration: Median Income
No Landlock
Interest Reduction






































Figures 6a-e: Model simulation where interest is reduced by the
full mortgage premium (180 basis points). Search effort is not
affected, since the landlock constraint remains. Households opti-
mally choose to save less given the lower cost of debt, thus dura-
tions are not affected. Welfare gains are substantial, but not as







The population rebound estimates in Figure 4 come from a stochastic
simulation of the model, where the elasticity of substitution, efficiency corre-
lation elasticity, and nominal budget shares of electricity and transportation
are treated as random variables.
• While we do not structurally estimate σ, we leverage empirical estimates
of price elasticities in the literature, and back-out ranges of short-run
elasticity of substitution (Table 2). With no distributional assumption
to guide us, we assume a uniform distribution from [0.1, 0.2], where both
bounding values roughly approximate the minimum/maximum observed
in the literature.
• To build-up an aggregate efficiency correlation elasticity, we simulate
efficiency-improvement choices for transportation and seven electricity
end-uses at the sub-aggregate level. For each end-use, households can
either choose the minimum or maximum efficiency choice, correspond-
ing to the minimum standard or best-in-class, respectively. Households
must choose at least and only one. With only partial empirical evidence
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on the propensity of each choice, and the correlations of choices across
end-uses, we assume that each choice is made independently, and the
probabilities of each choice within each end-use are equal. Once choices
are made, the composite electricity efficiency improvement is calculated
by weighting each end-use by its share of total electricity consumption.
The percent-efficiency increase corresponding the minimum and maxi-
mum efficiency choice for each end-use are reported in Table 3, along
with energy consumption levels for the electricity end-uses.
• Population nominal budget shares are assumed to follow a bivariate nor-
mal distribution to account for the large positive correlation observed be-

















mates come from the descriptive statistics of the Consumer Expenditure
Survey.










Proof. Note that the the household problem can be simplified to:











M ≥ X + pCEC + pTET
0 ≥ (X,EC , ET )
Next, note that for each input I, ∂U
∂I






that limI↓0 ∂U∂I = ∞ and limI↑∞ ∂U∂I = 0. Hence, the Inada conditions hold for
all inputs, implying that the nonnegativity constraint will never bind. There-
fore, we can remove this constraint without affecting the solution. The budget
set {(X,EC , ET ) : X + pCEC + pTET ≤ M} is compact. U(·) and Y are
continuous in (X,EC , ET ). Therefore, a solution exists. We can solve for the
solution using Lagrangean methods:
L(X,EC , ET , λ) = U(
[




+ λ (M −X − pCEC + pTET )
Because U(·) and the production function are strictly concave, the first-




(1− αC − αT )X σ−1σ + αCC σ−1σ + αTT σ−1σ
] 1
σ−1
(1− αC − αT )X− 1σ = λ
UY (Y )
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Dividing the second and third equations respectively by the first, and


















M = X + pCEC + pTET
Substituting the third equation into the first:
(M − pCEC − pTET )
(
αC














EC = (M − pTET )
(
αC






























Similarly, from the second equation:
pTET =
(











































1 + ZC + ZT
Plugging back into the first equation:
pCEC =
(
M − pCEC −M ZT
1 + ZC + ZT
)
ZC
pC (1 + ZC)EC = M
(
1 + ZC
































(1 + ZC + ZT ) (1− σ)ZCpC − ZC(1− σ)
ZC
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= (σ − 1) 1 + ZT
1 + ZC + ZT































= ηεC (EC) + 1



















= −(σ − 1)pCEC
M
The proof for ET is analogous: ηεT (EC) = −(σ − 1)pTETM .
Rebound is calculated as the cross-efficiency elasticity of energy work:
ηεC (T ). Assuming that changes in one efficiency are independent of another,
we have:


















= ηεC (ET )
Analogous for ET .
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Proposition 6.















































+ (ηεC (EC) + 1)
EC
E








+ rεC (ET )
ET
E
Total rebound is calculated as the elasticity of total energy services
with respect to one efficiency. For electricity, we have ηεC (C + T ).
ηεC (C + T ) =

















+ ηεC (T )
T
C + T
rεC (E) = rεC (EC)
C
C + T











































= ηεT (EC)ηεC (εT )
ηεC ,ec(EC) = ηεC (EC) + ηεT (EC)ηεC (εT )
Direct rebound is calculated as the elasticity of energy services with
respect to efficiency:





































= rεC (EC) + ηεC (εT )rεT (Ec)
Cross-efficiency elasticity is derived as:
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= ηεT (ET )ηεC (εT )
ηεC ,ec(ET ) = ηεC (ET ) + ηεT (ET )ηεC (εT )
The rebound equivalent is the elasticity of energy services:




















































= ηεT (T )ηεC (εT )
rεC ,ec(ET ) = rεC (ET ) + ηεC (εT )rεT (ET )
Total energy elasticity follows from Proposition 6. We have:
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ηεC ,ec(E) = ηεC ,ec(EC)
EC
E
+ ηεC ,ec(ET )
ET
E
= (ηεC (EC) + ηεT (EC)ηεC (εT ))
EC
E
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Efficiency with Income Reduction. In Proposition 4, there was no
change in income as a result of an efficiency increase. In reality, households
may pay for efficiency upgrades, and the resulting loss of income will have an
effect on total energy use.
Proposition. With income endogeneity, ηεi,IE(Ei) = ηεi(Ei) + ηεi(M)


























= ηεi(Ei) + ηεi(M)
.
Welfare of Efficiency Upgrades. Suppose a household is interested in
increasing the efficiency for energy i that comes with a per-unit cost of pεi .
Proposition. Backfire (ηεi(E) > 0) will occur if
M
pi
< Ei + Ej.









Plugging in for the structural format of both elasticities, as per Propo-



























< Ei + Ej
Proposition. A household will be better off by increasing the efficiency of
energy i if and only if piE
∗
i ≥ pεiεi.
Proof. First, re-write the Lagrangean function from Proposition 1 with C and
T replacing EC and ET , respectively, as the choice variables:
L(X,C, T, λ) = U(
[












The function is identical to the one before, and so are the solutions, so
we have that:
C∗ = εCE∗C , and
T ∗ = εTE∗T .
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The indirect utility function is:
V (M, p, εC , εT ) = U
([


























λ∗ is the value of the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint at





Consider a household which has the option to buy an incremental gain
in εC at a per-unit price pεC . The welfare gain from increased efficiency would
be λ∗ pC
εC
E∗ and the welfare loss from depleted income would be λ∗pεC . The













At the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, the main policy goal was
to stabilize the mortgage-backed securities (MBS) market. For example, the
Federal Reserve was quick to accept MBS as collateral for loans from the dis-
count window and through the Term Auction Facility [Bernanke, 2009]. Later
on, the purchases of new MBS became a staple of each quantitative easing
measure put forth. From the fiscal side, the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
raised the limits for GSE-purchasable mortgages. All of these measures were
designed to support the market for new mortgage origination, and mitigate
any disruptions in the MBS market. In 2009, as part of the ARRA, Congress
initiated the first-time homebuyer credit, offering a credit of up to $8,000 to-
ward a first-time homeowner’s home purchase [Baker, 2012]. This measure
was later augmented to existing homeowners as well. Again, the purpose of
these measures was to support house prices as well as the market for new
mortgages.1
1There were several reasons for this; first, since the subprime mortgage crisis was the
source of the unfolding financial crisis, the key concern for policymakers was stabilizing
markets and stemming the financial contagion. Also, lending standards tightened drastically
185
It was not until February of 2009 that the federal government un-
veiled a policy specifically designed for current borrowers, the Homeowners
Affordability and Stability Plan. This policy consisted of two programs, the
Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), and the Home Affordable
Refinance Program (HARP). The HAMP was designed to encourage lenders,
through various guidelines and subsidies, to modify mortgages for an estimated
7 to 8 million struggling homeowners. These modifications included reducing
interest, extending amortization schedules, and in some cases writing-down
principle, all in the hopes of lowering the probability of borrower default and
increasing the present expected value of the mortgage [HAM, 2012]. The
HARP, on the other hand, was a financing vehicle designed to help homeown-
ers with high loan-to-value ratios refinance on more favorable terms.2 While
both measures helped to alleviate the threat of cash-flow insolvency, neither
provided much assistance towards reducing balance-sheet insolvency. It is not
immediately clear why this goal was never strongly considered. It could be
the case that policymakers feared that principal write-downs would weaken the
balance sheets of the banks which held the underlying mortgages, threatening
an already fragile banking system. Or, perhaps policymakers were concerned
through 2008 and part of the policy response was to offset some of the effects of the increased
stringency . However, these measures did not come without criticism. For starters, it was
not immediately clear why the government should subsidize assets that were being shunned
by most in the financial community as “toxic.” Second, some wondered if these supporting
measures would only prolong the housing correction which was taking place. Indeed, while
house prices experienced temporary gains through the duration of both homebuyer credits,
they resumed their decline quickly after each one expired [MA, 2013, CoreLogic, 2013a].
2Both of these programs were administered by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
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about setting a precedent for “bailing out” homeowners as well, which could
have resulted in undesired moral hazard effects for future borrowers. What-
ever the case, from 2009 onwards, the policy target was homeowner assistance
programs was to promote mortgage modification rather than write-downs. As
stated in a 2009 Congressional Oversight Panel testimony, “any foreclosure
mitigation plan must be based on a method of modifying or refinancing dis-
tressed mortgages into affordable ones.” [Panel, 2009]
There are a few problems associated with this general approach. First,
as detailed by Mulligan, requiring that mortgage modifications be indexed to
income inadvertently transforms these measures into means-tested programs.
Thus, adhering to the qualifying prerequisites institutes an implicit income
tax of 31% for borrowers applying for modification [Mulligan, 2009, 2010].
Furthermore, even with a strong policy push towards modification, a 2009
Boston Fed study found that only 3% of all delinquent mortgages have been
modified [Adelino et al., 2013].
The authors of that study point towards securitization and the in-
creased complexity of the mortgage ownership structure as a potential fac-
tor for the low rate of modification, a point also brought up by Chan [Chan,
2001]. This feature of the mortgage industry also shows why it is very hard
to complete a short sale – where the principal owed is reduced to facilitate
a sale – and reinforces the notion that negative equity without offsetting as-
sets does in fact “lock” homeowners in their current residence. Moreover,
the authors indicate that there are several risks involved with implementing
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a modification. First, there is “self-cure” risk: about 30% of delinquent loans
resume scheduled payments on their own. Thus, there is a 30% chance that
the modification yields no value to the bank. Second, many homeowners who
receive a modification ultimately end up in default anyway, again proving the
modification pointless. The authors conclude that it is very difficult for banks
to observe which loans are self-curable and which are sunk, thereby sharply
reducing the expected profit of any potential modifications. This seems quite
intuitive from an asymmetric information perspective; every borrower has an
incentive to signal that they are in “true” need of modification, creating ad-
verse selection in these pools of homeowners [Foote et al., 2008]. It is thus
not entirely surprising that these initiatives have fallen well below their stated
goals.
With the exception of the rare principal write-down in the modification
process, none of the policies mentioned above specifically target negative equity
homeowners. If negative equity restrains mobility and hampers employment,
then eliminating the landlock effect imposed by negative equity could yield
substantial benefits in the labor market by “unlocking” laborers who were
previously geographically immobile. Moreover, policymakers may find helping
homeowners from whom moving is impossible to be a worthier objective than
helping homeowners from whom moving is feasible but costly. Section 5 of
this paper will utilize a search model to evaluate the effectiveness of removing
the landlock constraint, in comparison to the current policy of reducing the
service cost of debt. In the model, removing the landlock constraint not only
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leads to higher welfare than interest reduction, but also decreases expected
duration by allowing homeowners to immediately search for and relocate to
better opportunities.
To my knowledge, there has been little discussion in the literature on
optimal mortgage-finance policies to combat negative equity. An exception
would be Posner and Zingales, who advocate for a policy which allows under-
water homeowners to force a renegotiation of the principal down to current
value, in exchange for a shared equity agreement on the future appreciate of the
home between the homeowner and lender [Posner and Zingales, 2009]. This
plan specifically targets the negative equity problem, and although the au-
thors focus on the negative costs associated with foreclosure, would indirectly
remove the landlock constraint as well. What remains unclear, however, is
whether this plan would pay off for lenders. For example, my model predicts
that durations are dramatically reduced once the landlock friction is lifted. If
the homeowner was quick to sell upon the restructuring, it seems unlikely that
the lender would break even through a equity stake in the future appreciation
of the home. Also, as previously mentioned, the increasing complex ownership
structure of mortgage debt makes the feasibility of such an agreement ques-
tionable. Still, the plan points in the right direction as combating negative
equity, rather than mortgage payments, as the main source of mortgage-finance
troubles in the current climate.
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